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This Article provides the first-ever examination of the normative challenges 
posed by bringing international human rights claims in state courts under the 
common law of torts.  It argues that the normative structure of the private law 
of torts cannot adequately address the very different concerns at stake when 
addressing public harms.  Torts address issues that arise between two parties 
and those parties alone.  But public law addresses harms done simultaneously 
to individuals and to the body politic.  Redress for public harms should 
encompass both individual and systemic remedies, but tort law offers only the 
former.  Instead of advancing tort claims, advocates should urge state courts to 
exercise their concurrent jurisdiction over the customary international legal 
norms incorporated into the federal common law to hear claims for violations of 
international human rights. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Unless advocates make careful choices about where and under 
what theories to file the next generation of human rights cases in the 
United States, the impending shift from federal to state courts will rob 
those cases of their public character and will reduce them to “garden 
variety municipal torts.”1  Such an outcome will threaten the ability of 
such litigation to catalyze the kind of systemic change necessary to 
address human rights abuses. 
Since 1980, U.S. courts have provided a forum, under the Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS), sometimes referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA), in which victims of human rights violations from all over the 
world could seek redress (in the form of civil damages) for their abuses 
against the individuals who perpetrated them.2  In the early years of 
ATS litigation, the cases almost exclusively arose when foreign 
plaintiffs sued foreign natural persons for conduct that occurred in a 
foreign country.3  Starting in the mid-1990s more cases began to be 
filed against multinational enterprises (MNEs) for their conduct 
overseas. 
For the better part of four decades, ATS cases have commanded 
a significant share of the attention of scholars and advocates 
concerned with enforcing human rights.4  This is in part because at the 
time of its inception, ATS litigation was one of very few available 
 
 1  District Judge Woodlock first used that phrase in the ATS context in his opinion 
in Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995) (“[R]eading [28 U.S.C.] 
§ 1350 as essentially a jurisdictional grant only and then looking to domestic tort law 
to provide the cause of action mutes the grave international law aspect of the tort, 
reducing it to no more (or less) than a garden-variety municipal tort.”).  See infra Part 
III, for a fuller discussion of the ways in which classical tort law is unsuitable for 
describing human rights violations.   
 2  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).  
 3  These are frequently referred to as “foreign cubed” cases.  The term “foreign 
cubed” is generally credited to Stuart M. Grant and Diane Zilka.  See generally Stuart M. 
Grant & Diane Zilka, The Role of Foreign Investors in Federal Securities Class Actions, in 
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (NUMBER B-1442) 91, 96 
(Practising L. Inst. ed., 2004). 
 4  ATS litigation has generated over 227 law review articles (with ATS or ATCA in 
the title alone) and 223 cases.  Roger P. Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation 
After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749, 1751–52 (2014) (“The history of 
international human rights litigation under the ATS is well known.  Since Filártiga v. 
Peña-Irala, such litigation has become something of a cottage industry, with over 150 
cases filed alleging the commission of a tort in violation of the law of nations.”). 
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enforcement mechanisms for the then-nascent body of international 
human rights law.  It is also in part because even as the international 
human rights regime came into its own and more enforcement 
mechanisms came into existence, their institutional architects by and 
large adopted soft-law approaches more akin to diplomacy than to 
adjudication.5  At the time the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
decided the first ATS case in 1980, human rights had barely begun its 
transformation from political aspirations to legal standards.  The 
United Nations Human Rights Commission (“the Commission”) was 
established by the Charter of the United Nations in 1946 but focused 
on promulgating human rights texts and treaties rather than on 
serving as an enforcement mechanism.6  The Commission produced 
the first major international human rights treaties in 1966 but they did 
not enter into force until 1976.7  The committees charged with 
overseeing the implementation of those treaties adopted the model of 
diplomatic dialogue common to other United Nations (UN) 
committees rather than a more oppositional model based on 
adjudication.8  The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was 
established pursuant to the American Convention on Human Rights 
in 1979, but the court did not issue its first judgment on the merits in 
a contentious case until 1988.9  Other regional mechanisms, like the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and the European 
Court of Human Rights, are limited by resource constraints, state 
 
 5  Eric Posner captures the weakness of international human rights enforcement 
mechanisms.  ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 39–52 (2014).  
Posner is generally skeptical of the value and efficacy of international human rights 
discourse, but many of the same points are made by ardent supporters.  See, e.g., 
GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 
(3d ed. 2007). 
 6  Brief Historic Overview of the Commission on Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUM. 
RTS. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/ 
CHR/BriefHistoric.doc (“For the first 20 years (1947-1966), the Commission 
concentrated its efforts on standard-setting.”). 
 7  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200 
(XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), http://www.ohchr.org/en/ 
professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx; International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) 
(Dec. 16, 1966), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ 
CESCR.aspx. 
 8  The committees exercise the latter function only when expressly authorized to 
do so by countries that ratify a separate treaty.  See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCCPR1.aspx.   
 9  Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988). 
MILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2016  5:36 PM 
508 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:361 
 
intransigence, and limited powers.  None of the bodies at the 
international or regional levels involve claims against individuals, only 
against states. 
ATS litigation, on the other hand, has provided international law 
with a much-needed and much sought-after path to liability for 
individuals (whether natural or corporate).10  This litigation has 
offered victims of human rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity a chance to face their abusers directly and to have a court of 
law adjudicate their cases.  Judges who deliberated on the 
interpretation of international human rights law became connected to 
their counterparts in the global legal conversation that shapes the 
world’s increasingly shared understanding of transnational legal 
norms.  Judges in ATS cases have interpreted and applied 
international law regarding, among other things, torture,11 
extrajudicial execution,12 disappearance,13 arbitrary detention,14 
incitement to genocide,15 and human trafficking.16  Importantly, the 
ATS also offered one of the few ways to hold MNEs accountable for 
their complicity in human rights abuses.17  Although damage awards in 
 
 10  See infra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.   
 11  See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that torture 
violates the law of nations and that the ATS gives federal courts subject matter 
jurisdiction over such claims).  
 12  See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (awarding over forty-
seven million dollars to plaintiffs who suffered human rights violations, including 
extrajudicial execution, due to the actions of the Guatemalan Defense Minister). 
 13  See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (awarding plaintiff 
four million dollars in total damages on claims of torture, prolonged arbitrary 
detention, and disappearances); see also Reyes v. Grijalba, No. 02-22046-civ-
lenard/klein (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2006) (awarding plaintiffs forty seven million dollars 
for torture and disappearances in Honduras), http://www.ccrjustice.org/sites/ 
default/files/assets/files/Reyes%20v%20Grijalba%20%20final%20judgment%20Ma
r%202006.pdf. 
 14  See Kpadeh v. Emmanuel, 261 F.R.D. 687 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (awarding plaintiffs 
over twenty-two million dollars for Charles “Chuckie” Taylor’s human rights violations 
in Liberia, including arbitrary detention). 
 15  See Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94-cv-3627, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4409 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1996) (awarding plaintiffs about $105 million on claims of incitement 
to genocide during the Rwandan genocide).  
 16  See United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156 (3d Cir. 2010) (ordering 
defendant to settle with trafficked minors for $725,000 for engaging in child sex 
trafficking); Aguilar v. Imperial Nurseries, No. 3-07-cv-193, 2008 WL 2572250 (D. 
Conn. May 28, 2008) (entering judgment against defendants who forced twelve 
trafficked Guatemalan plaintiffs in Connecticut to work for little pay at a tree nursery). 
 17  The power of MNEs, in many cases, rivals or exceeds the power of many states.  
MNEs have the ability to inflict harms on the same scale and of the same character as 
states’ violations of human rights norms.  Thus, although MNEs are not states and 
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ATS cases were rarely collected, judgments in favor of plaintiffs 
contributed to the doctrinal and normative development of 
international law and provided ammunition for advocacy against 
offending governments or MNEs.18 
But in the 2013 case of Kiobel vs. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the 
Supreme Court closed the door on most, if not all, claims under the 
ATS in U.S. courts.19  In Kiobel, twelve Nigerian plaintiffs sued on behalf 
of their relatives who had been detained, tortured, given show trials, 
and executed by the Nigerian military in retaliation for peacefully 
protesting aggressive oil exploitation in their homeland.  The plaintiffs 
contended that Royal Dutch Petroleum’s local subsidiary, Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, provided funds, food, 
and a base of operations to the soldiers and therefore was complicit in 
the soldiers’ violations of international law.20  Ultimately at issue in 
Kiobel was whether the ATS gave the courts jurisdiction over acts that 
occurred outside of U.S. territory.21  The Court unanimously 
 
therefore do not have obligations under international human rights law, scholars, 
advocates, and major institutional players have been searching for both theoretical 
and practical ways to hold MNEs accountable for human rights violations.  See, e.g., 
LARA JILL BLECHER ET AL., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS: NEW 
EXPECTATIONS AND PARADIGMS (2015); NICOLA M. C. P. JÄGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN 
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH OF ACCOUNTABILITY (2002).   
 18  See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE 
L.J. 2347 (1991).  In this seminal article, Koh identifies ATS cases and other similar 
actions as part of an emerging trend he dubs transnational public law litigation (TPL).  
TPL is generally understood to involve states, government officials, and private 
individuals suing one another, and being sued in turn, in cases that require the 
simultaneous application of domestic law and international law (both treaty-based and 
customary).  ATS cases are not the only example of TPL.  Other examples include: In 
re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal India in December, 1984, 809 
F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987) and Philippines v. Marcos, 653 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).  
These, however, are the minority when compared to the volume of ATS litigation.  
Since Filártiga, there have been about 173 judicial opinions regarding the ATS.  
Donald R. Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of 
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 713 (2012); see also Julian G. Ku, The Curious 
Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial 
Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 357 (2011). 
 19  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 20  Id. at 1663. 
 21  This was not the original issue on which the Court granted certiorari.  Plaintiffs 
appealed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ finding that the ATS did not cover acts 
undertaken by corporations but only natural persons.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at 10, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL 2326721, at *10 (arguing that the 
decision “asserts a radical overhaul of all existing ATS jurisprudence . . . by creating a 
blanket immunity for corporations engaged or complicit in universally condemned 
human rights violations”).  After oral arguments on that question, the Court took the 
unusual step of ordering re-argument on the question of whether the presumption of 
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concluded that it did not, reviving a presumption against the 
extraterritorial application of the laws of the United States.22  Finding 
no evidence of Congressional intent to extend the ATS to conduct in 
foreign countries, the Court ruled that the presumption applied, that 
plaintiffs did not have a cause of action under the ATS.23  Furthermore, 
the court held that “even where the claims touch and concern the 
territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to 
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”24 
Although the criteria announced by the Court could, in theory, 
be satisfied fairly easily, lower courts applying Kiobel have held plaintiffs 
seeking to overcome the presumption on extraterritoriality to an 
extremely high standard.25  Plaintiffs in Balintulo v. Daimler AG,26 the 
long-running apartheid case, argued in the Second Circuit that their 
claim met Kiobel’s “touch and concern” standard because the 
defendants, corporations that had allegedly assisted South Africa in the 
maintenance of the apartheid regime, were U.S. nationals.27  The 
Second Circuit was unconvinced.28  The plaintiffs’ assertion that their 
claims arose in part from actions taken inside the United States by the 
defendants did not sway the court.29  Other courts have taken a 
similarly stringent view of the requirements of the “touch and concern” 
standard.30 
 
extraterritoriality applied to the ATS.  Brief of Amici Curiae Washington Legal 
Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation in Support of Respondents on 
Reargument at 3, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 3245484, at *3.  
 22  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (“[T]he presumption against extraterritoriality applies 
to claims under the ATS, and . . . nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”).  
 23  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 140 (2d Cir. 2010) aff’d, 133 
S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (“It bears underscoring that the purpose of the ATS was not to 
encourage United States courts to create new norms of customary international law 
unilaterally.”).  
 24  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
 25  Marco Basile, Nine Months Later: Kiobel in the Courts, AJIL UNBOUND (Jan. 28, 
2014, 3:59 PM), http://www.asil.org/blogs/nine-months-later-kiobel-lower-courts.   
 26  727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013).  
 27  Id. at 189; see also Basile, supra note 25.  
 28  Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 191 (explaining that “[p]laintiffs’ . . . case-specific policy 
arguments miss the mark”).  
 29  Id. at 192 (holding that the defendants could not be held vicariously liable for 
their conduct under the ATS because their agents “did not commit relevant conduct 
within the United States giving rise to a violation of customary international law—that 
is, because the asserted ‘violation[s] of the law of nations occur[ed] outside the United 
States’”) (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013)).  
 30  Basile, supra note 25 (“Balintulo . . . is representative of lower courts’ 
approach . . . . [O]ther federal courts have ruled that it is insufficient that a defendant 
corporation is a U.S. national (Adhikari), made some decisions in the United States 
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The upshot of the Kiobel decision and the few cases applying it 
thus far is that the Court has closed the doors of federal courts to most 
international human rights cases.  That is not to say that all human 
rights claims arising overseas are forever barred.  A few avenues 
remain.  Advocates will no doubt continue to take advantage of the 
Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA)31 and the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA)32—both providing a statutory basis for victims of 
harms suffered overseas to bring claims in U.S. courts.  Another 
potential route is to take action against individual corporate officers 
for actions in the United States.33  But the TVPA, the VAWA, and the 
speculative possibility of suing corporate officers collectively cover only 
a small fraction of the claims previously available under the ATS, which 
included any claim arising under the “law of nations” as the term was 
defined by the Supreme Court.34 
By barring all or most ATS cases in federal courts, the Supreme 
Court has cleared the conceptual space previously occupied by 
advocacy under and analysis of the ATS.35  Scholars and advocates have 
begun to explore that newly vacated space, advancing several creative 
approaches to holding human rights abusers—especially MNEs—
 
regarding the conduct (Giraldo), or had ‘substantial operations in this country,’ 
including billions of dollars of assets (Rio Tinto).  Other courts have held that it’s 
insufficient that a defendant had taken refuge in the United States to avoid 
prosecution (Dacer) or that a defendant ‘specifically directed’ an online propaganda 
campaign at persons living in the United States (Chen Gang).”).  
 31  The TVPA allows a torture victim to initiate civil suits in the United States 
against the perpetrator for damages.  See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. 
L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)), 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c102:H.R.2092.ENR [hereinafter TVPA].  
 32  The VAWA, for example, mandates that victims cannot be forced to pay for a 
rape exam, ensuring that the victim’s protection order is enforced and increasing the 
rate of prosecution against perpetrators.  For a full list, see Factsheet: The Violence Against 
Women Act, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
docs/vawa_factsheet.pdf. 
 33  See JENNIFER ZERK, CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
(2015), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLaw 
Remedies/StudyDomesticeLawRemedies.pdf (discussing the issue and possible 
solutions); see also Corporations Must be Held Accountable for Human Rights Violations, 
UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Feb. 20, 2012), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/CorporationsMustBeHeldAccountab
leForHRViolations.aspx.  
 34  See infra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
 35  See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  It is important to note that the decline 
in the fortunes of the ATS was by no means wholly caused by the Court’s decision in 
Kiobel.  See also Susan Simpson, Alien Tort Statute Cases Resulting in Plaintiff Victories, THE 
VIEW FROM LL2 (Nov. 11, 2009), http://viewfromll2.com/2009/11/11/alien-tort-
statute-cases-resulting-in-plaintiff-victories/.   
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accountable.  One such approach rests on the contention that the 
interests of both multinational corporations and the individuals 
potentially harmed by those corporations’ activities would be well 
served by an International Court of Civil Justice (ICCJ) empowered to 
hear claims for damages brought by individuals.36  An ICCJ would 
obviate the need to reform national legal systems in ways that might be 
difficult and complicated.37  Other commentators argue directly for 
undertaking the difficult and complicated task of reforming national 
legal systems to close off the escape routes currently available to 
MNEs.38  Still others argue that international human rights law needs 
to be amended to provide explicitly for individual and corporate 
liability for human rights abuses.39 
Some commentators have suggested focusing on the political 
branches of state government.40  Governors, for instance, have been 
very active in international affairs in ways that, while profound, seem 
not to have spurred concerns about encroachment on the foreign 
relations power of the federal executive.41  Governors respond to the 
demands made by foreign governments and international institutions, 
enter into international agreements, and impose, often at their 
discretion, sanctions authorized by the state legislature.42  Surely where 
such an exercise of state executive power on the international stage is 
unremarkable, governors could be urged to act by, for example, 
importing international human rights standards into state 
administrative regulations. 
 
 36  Maya Steinitz, The Case for an International Court of Civil Justice, 67 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 75 (2014); Maya Steinitz & Paul Gowder, Transnational Litigation as Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
 37  See Steinitz, supra note 36 (discussing the “problem of the missing forum” where 
U.S. courts will send a case back to the courts of the country where the injury occurred 
on a forum non conveniens motion, then refuse to enforce the judgment produced by 
those same courts on the grounds of corruption in the judicial system). 
 38  Janet Dine, Jurisdictional Arbitrage by Multinational Companies: A National Law 
Solution?, 3 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV’T. 44 (2012).  
 39  HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION (4th ed. 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript). 
 40  Zachary D. Clopton, State Law Litigation of International Norms: Horizontal and 
Vertical Dimensions, 108 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. PROC., 2014, at 433–36. 
 41  Julian G. Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2391–92 (2006) 
(“[G]overnors can also take a more direct and assertive role in foreign policy by 
negotiating and entering into international agreements . . . . These agreements seek 
to regulate a variety of international matters such as fuel tax allocation, crossborder 
motor vehicle regulation, natural resources management, and even greenhouse gas 
emissions.”).  
 42  Id. at 2385.   
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Similarly, at least one commentator has noted that state 
legislatures could be urged to pass some version of a state ATS 
explicitly authorizing ATS-style claims in state courts.43  Such a statute 
would give the legislature(s) involved the chance to dispel much of the 
ambiguity created by the sparse language of the ATS by, for instance, 
specifying the international law claims being authorized.44 
Many scholars and advocates, however, are not ready to give up 
on the possibility of bringing human rights claims in U.S. courts under 
existing law.  In exploring ways to preserve the advantages of ATS 
litigation mentioned above, these stalwarts are therefore turning their 
attention to state courts as the next vanguard of human rights litigation 
in the United States.45  The move to state courts offers several 
advantages.  First and foremost, it would not require marshaling 
international consensus, the way an ICCJ would, or engaging in 
extensive domestic legal reform, the way establishing enterprise 
liability in dozens of successive countries would.  Furthermore, 
assuming that plaintiffs are fortunate enough to establish personal 
jurisdiction, state courts are the only place where individual agents of 
the state might be called to account for human rights violations that 
fall short of war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
The most important advantage of state courts might be their 
freedom from the constitutional limitations imposed on the 
jurisdiction of federal courts.  As courts of general jurisdiction, state 
courts would be able to entertain ATS-like claims as torts without an 
enabling statute.  After all, “[a]lmost every international law violation 
is also an intentional tort.  Torture is assault and battery.  Terrorism is 
wrongful death.  Slavery is false imprisonment.”46  That would, in 
 
 43  See generally Clopton, supra note 40. 
 44  See generally Ernest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and 
Transnational Public-Law Litigation After Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023 (2015) (discussing 
the need for such a statute on the federal level and the elements that might be 
included).  See also Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 177 YALE 
L.J. 408 (2007); Ernest A. Young, Toward a Framework Statute for Supranational 
Adjudication, 57 EMORY L.J. 93 (2007). 
 45  See Alford, supra note 4; Childress III, supra note 18, at 743.  The Irvine Law 
Review also recently published a symposium issue on human rights litigation in state 
courts.  See generally Christopher A. Whytock, Donald Earl Childress III & Michael D. 
Ramsey, After Kiobel: International Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State 
Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013); see also Patrick J. Borchers, Conflict of Laws 
Considerations in State Court Human Rights Actions, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 45 (2013); Paul 
Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under State Law and in State 
Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9 (2013); Chimène I. Keitener, State Torts and Transitory 
Torts in Transnational and Human Rights Cases, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 81 (2013). 
 46  Alford, supra note 4, at 1750.  
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theory, free state courts from the straightjacket imposed on federal 
courts by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.47  It 
could also make it easier for plaintiffs to prove their cases since the 
elements of assault, for instance, are considerably easier to show than 
the elements of torture.48  In addition, nearly every legal system 
provides some kind of remedy for tort harms, reducing the danger that 
choice-of-law analyses favoring the law of the place of injury would 
deprive plaintiffs of a cause of action.49 
But state courts are hardly a panacea.  Potential plaintiffs will face 
obstacles such as obtaining personal jurisdiction,50 surviving forum non 
conveniens motions,51 overcoming common law doctrines of immunity, 
and conforming to the requirements of due process52—not to mention 
the logistical difficulties of locating evidence and witnesses overseas 
and producing them in the United States.  Perhaps the disparity 
between the apparent ease of translating human rights abuses into tort 
harms and the difficulty of finding a way through the barriers to 
accessing state courts explains why scholars have, to date, focused 
almost exclusively on the latter issue. 
This Article instead focuses on what happens if those barriers are 
overcome, showing that translating human rights abuses into tort 
harms sacrifices normativity at the altar of practicality, and in so doing 
undermines many of the aims that have animated the last thirty years 
of human rights litigation in federal courts.  In so doing, this Article 
assumes, for the sake of argument, that committed and formidable 
advocates will in some cases manage to overcome the obstacles to 
access and will succeed in bringing international human rights cases, 
 
 47  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (“Whatever the ultimate 
criteria for accepting a cause of action subject to jurisdiction under § 1350, we are 
persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal 
common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and 
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 
was enacted.”).  To take but one example, international human rights law requires that 
individuals, who are arrested and imprisoned, have their case assessed by a judge 
“promptly.”  ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 9.  While someone who was administratively 
detained (i.e. imprisoned without warrant, probable cause, or other legal authority) 
or arrested and jailed for an extended period of time might have a claim of false 
imprisonment, the prohibition on extended, unreviewed detention would probably 
not rise to the level of the law of nations as defined by the Supreme Court in Sosa.   
 48  Whytock et al., supra note 45, at 6.  
 49  David Kaye, State Execution of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 95, 101 (2013).  
 50  Borchers, supra note 45, at 49.  
 51  Id.  
 52  Id. at 58; Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 45, at 9 n.57 and accompanying text. 
MILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2016  5:36 PM 
2016] HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AS TORT HARMS 515 
 
appropriately translated into torts, into state courts.  It then asks the 
question:  What would success look like?  Human rights law is a body 
of public law that ultimately aims to delineate the appropriate 
boundaries of the relationship between the governing and the 
governed.  ATS cases, although taking the typically private-law form of 
individual claims for damages, largely preserved that public character.  
Indeed, both advocates and courts went to great lengths to argue for 
public international law, and not municipal tort law, private law, to be 
the law of decision in ATS cases.  If the public character of ATS cases 
is worth preserving, the success or failure of that preservation adds 
another dimension to questions about the future after Kiobel and about 
the viability of translating human rights abuses into torts. 
This Article will tease out the tension inherent in the public/
private dichotomy by showing, in Part II, that courts repeatedly evinced 
a strong preference for public international law over private tort law.  
In so doing, the courts added a “public international tort” to the two 
“constitutional torts” recognized by the Supreme Court in Monroe v. 
Pape53 and in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics.54  These “public torts” are carefully constructed hybrids of 
public and private law.  Part III will argue that fully translating human 
rights harms into tort claims upends that careful construction by 
showing, first, that the notion of equality underlying tort law is 
incompatible with the very different notion of equality at stake in 
addressing public harms and, second, that the remedies adequate for 
addressing violations of the public and private law are different in kind.  
Finally, Part IV will propose a novel approach that would preserve the 
advantages of turning to state courts after Kiobel without sacrificing the 
normative value of describing public harms using the public law.  
Advocates should bring cases in state courts under the federal common 
law of customary international law, which state courts are compelled 





 53  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  Monell “overrules” Monroe only to 
the extent that it removes immunity from § 1983 claims for municipalities. 
 54  403 U.S. 388 (1971).  
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II. THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL TORT 
Time and again, starting with Filártiga v. Peña-Irala55 in 1980 and 
continuing through the foundational first fifteen years of 
jurisprudence, courts were called on to decide—among many other 
challenging legal questions—whether the rule of decision in ATS cases 
was international law or municipal torts.  Time and again, starting with 
Filártiga, the courts decided on international law.  In so doing, they 
replicated the model of the constitutional tort developed in the two 
decades preceding the revival of the ATS. 
A. Hostis Humani Generis 
ATS cases did not have to be international human rights cases.  
They became such as the result of the conscious choices of advocates 
and judges, which included explicitly rejecting domestic tort law as 
inadequate to capture the magnitude of human rights abuses and 
favoring public international law as the rule of decision in ATS cases.56 
In 1980, the case of Filártiga57 revolutionized human rights 
advocacy by giving victims of human rights abuses a forum in the 
federal courts of the United States where they could bring cases against 
their foreign oppressors for acts that took place on foreign soil.58  The 
ATS, originally passed by Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
later became codified in its modern form in § 1350 of the U.S. Code 
as Alien’s action for tort.59  The text of the statute is only thirty-three words 
long.  It reads in full: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”60  In the nearly two 
 
 55  630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 56  See William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation: Road Not Taken, 89 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1577 (2014), for a thorough and incisive history of those decisions and their 
implications. 
 57  630 F.2d at 876 (finding that torture violated the law of nations as defined in 
the ATS, and thus set the precedent for U.S. federal courts to have jurisdiction over 
cases concerning torts committed abroad that violated international law); see also BETH 
STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS xxii (2d ed. 
2008) (noting that Filártiga was “the first successful use of the [ATS] to enable victims 
of international human rights violations to sue in U.S. courts”). 
 58  Such fact patterns have come to be called “foreign cubed” or “f-cubed” by ATS 
practitioners.  See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(“This is the first so-called ‘foreign-cubed’ securities class action to reach this Circuit.”) 
(citing Grant et al., supra note 3, at 96 (coining the term “foreign-cubed”)), aff’d, 561 
U.S. 247 (2010).  
 59  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  See also, Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien 
Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1470 (2014). 
 60  § 1350. 
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hundred years that the statute was on the books prior to Filártiga, it was 
applied only a handful of times,61 and none of those cases dealt with 
the newly invented body of international human rights law.62 
At the outset of the modern era of ATS litigation, it was therefore 
unclear whether such claims would survive an objection to jurisdiction, 
much less what the rule of decision would be should a court reach the 
merits.  The Filártiga case came about when Dr. Joel Filártiga and his 
daughter Dolly, who were living in the United States, learned that 
Americo Norberto Peña-Irala (“Peña”) was living in New York City.63  
Peña, a former Inspector General in the Paraguyan police force, had 
tortured Joelito (son to Joel and brother to Dolly) to death in 
retaliation for his father’s political views.64  In a landmark decision, the 
Second Circuit found that the ATS did grant jurisdiction over claims 
such as the Filártigas’, provided that the allegations made in the 
complaint in fact constituted a violation of international law.65 
Although the primary issue in Filártiga was jurisdiction,66 the 
arguments of the parties, the decision of the Second Circuit, and the 
decision of the district court on remand, framed much of the 
subsequent debate about the proper rule of decision.  In the district 
court, in support of their argument that the claim satisfied the 
jurisdictional requirements of the ATS, the Filártigas submitted 
affidavits from titans of international law confirming that the 
prohibition of torture had coalesced into a norm of customary 
international law.67  The defense did not contest plaintiffs’ 
 
 61  See Simpson, supra note 35. 
 62  When Filártiga was first filed in 1979, human rights law was barely ten years old.  
Although the Charter of the United Nations mentions human rights, and the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
1948, the first legal instruments containing human rights obligations were opened for 
signature in 1967 and entered into force in 1976.  See ICCPR, supra note 7; ICESCR, 
supra note 7.   
 63  Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 87879 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 64  Id. at 878. 
 65  Id. at 88788. 
 66  Id. at 887 (“[W]e reverse the judgment of the district court dismissing the 
complaint for want of federal jurisdiction.”). 
 67  The plaintiffs had to rely on customary international law, or the law of nations.  
The other prong of the ATS, the treaties of the United States, was unavailable to them 
since the United States had yet to ratify a treaty that prohibited torture.  It has since 
ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.  See WILLIAM J. ACEVES, THE ANATOMY OF TORTURE: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF FILÁRTIGA V. PEÑA IRALA 334 (2007) (“By virtue of, inter alia, article 5 of the 
Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] and Article 7 of the Covenant [on Civil and 
Political Rights], torture is an offense against the Law of Nations . . . .  While the real 
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characterization of international law at either the trial or appellate 
level.68  Rather, the defendants argued that the constitutional limits on 
the causes of action over which Congress could grant federal 
jurisdiction—through § 1350 or any statute—were limited (at most) to 
a small subset of international law encompassed by the operation in 
U.S. jurisprudence of the term of art “the law of nations.”69  The 
defense went further and implicitly ceded the question of whether 
torture was a violation of customary international law.  The defense 
argued that the court should ignore the many treaties and other 
international declarations cited by the plaintiffs, not because the 
plaintiffs misconstrued the current state of international law, but 
because customary international law on its own was incapable of 
creating enforceable obligations in U.S. courts outside a narrow band 
of breaches of the law of nations.70  The defense relied in part on 
language from the Second Circuit’s opinion in Dreyfus v. Von Fink 
suggesting that the international law could not reach the question of a 
state’s treatment of its own citizens.71  In other words, rather than 
contest the claim that customary international law prohibited torture, 
the defense argued that the prohibition did not matter because the law 
of nations in the United States was restricted to state-state disputes.72  
Thus when the Second Circuit interpreted the scope of § 1350 as 
encompassing international law generally (as opposed to the 
constrained version argued for by the defense), the plaintiffs’ version 
of that general international law stood unopposed. 
Although deciding only the question of jurisdiction, the Second 
Circuit expressed its holding in such strong language that its opinion 
exerted significant influence on the next decade-and-a-half of debate 
over the applicable law.  This debate was conducted, at least in part, 
over the effect of the choice of law on the ability of U.S. courts to live 
 
party in interest in these offenses against human rights is the individual, it has long 
been recognized that such offenses vitally affect relations between states.”) (affidavit 
of Myres S. MacDougal, Professor of Law at Yale Law School).  
 68  Id. at 298. 
 69  Id. at 302 (“Where in this grant is the authority of Congress to confer upon the 
United States District Courts jurisdiction over ‘any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations?’”).  
 70  Id. at 305–06 (“Indeed, that statute [§ 1350] could not be construed to confer 
jurisdiction over a case such as this, because, if it were, it would be beyond the authority 
granted to Congress by Article III of the Federal Constitution.”).  
 71  Id. at 305 (citing Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30–31 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976)).  
 72  Id. at 302 (explaining that cases “have restricted the phrase ‘law of nations’ to 
relations between states rather than among individuals”). 
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up to their obligation to enforce the collective will of the community 
of nations.  The court held, for instance, relying in part on the 
plaintiffs’ uncontested expert opinions,73 that: 
In light of the universal condemnation of torture in 
numerous international agreements, and the renunciation 
of torture as an instrument of official policy by virtually all of 
the nations of the world (in principle if not in practice), we 
find that an act of torture committed by a state official against 
one held in detention violates established norms of the 
international law of human rights, and hence the law of 
nations.74 
The Second Circuit dismissed the notion from Dreyfus relied on 
by Filártiga—that international law encompassed only obligations of 
states vis-à-vis other states—as “clearly out of tune with the current 
usage and practice of international law.”75  Finally, the Second Circuit 
concluded with a now-famous passage that painted the ability of 
torture victims to pursue civil liability against their torturers as an 
important part of modernity’s quest to perfect the relationship of a 
state to its citizens.  Because of its influence on the conceptualization 
of ATS cases as human rights (as opposed to tort) claims, the passage 
is worth quoting in full: 
In the twentieth century the international community has 
come to recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant 
disregard of basic human rights and particularly the right to 
be free of torture.  Spurred first by the Great War, and then 
the Second, civilized nations have banded together to 
prescribe acceptable norms of international behavior.  From 
the ashes of the Second World War arose the United Nations 
Organization, amid hopes that an era of peace and 
cooperation had at last begun.  Though many of these 
aspirations have remained elusive goals, that circumstance 
cannot diminish the true progress that has been made.  In 
the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations 
have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize 
that respect for fundamental human rights is in their 
 
 73  ACEVES, supra note 67, at 584 (“The Filártigas submitted the affidavits of a 
number of distinguished international legal scholars, who stated unanimously that the 
law of nations prohibits absolutely the use of torture as alleged in the complaint.”).  
The court went on to quote the experts extensively in a footnote.  See id. at 584 n.4. 
 74  Id. at 585–86. 
 75  Id. at 745 (citing Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980)) 
(providing a copy of the court opinion in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984)).  
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individual and collective interest.  Among the rights 
universally proclaimed by all nations, as we have noted, is the 
right to be free of physical torture.  Indeed, for purposes of 
civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave 
trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all 
mankind.  Our holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional 
provision enacted by our First Congress, is a small but 
important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free 
all people from brutal violence.76 
Although the Second Circuit did not decide the issue of the law 
to be applied to the case’s merits—and even suggested that the law of 
the place of injury, Paraguay, might apply,77—the court clearly signaled 
its understanding that the ATS served functions distinctly in the realm 
of public law: states’ peaceful foreign relations and the rights-based 
restraints on those states’ treatment of the people in their territory.  It 
is important to emphasize that this language suggested not only that 
international law might be an appropriate rule of decision, but that 
courts might even be obliged by the weight and significance of the rights 
at stake to choose international law. 
In the trial on remand, the plaintiffs built on the expansive 
opinion of the Second Circuit to argue that the law of Paraguay 
inadequately captured the nature of torture.  They argued that the 
problem of torture is by definition international and that it is 
universally condemned: “Thus, present in this case is the compelling 
interest of the community of nations as well as this nation in the 
condemnation of torture.  It is not a simple crime but a crime which 
transcends the balance of civilization itself.”78  The transcendent nature 
of torture meant that it should not be reduced to national law.79  The 
district court agreed, deciding the question of whether “the ‘tort’ to 
which the statute refers mean a wrong ‘in violation of the law of 
 
 76   Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 890.  
 77  The court discussed the doctrine of transitory tort at length, where a tortfeasor 
may be sued in U.S. courts for a tort committed abroad, and where courts would 
normally apply the law of the place of injury.  In that context, the court noted, in 
passing, that the law of Paraguay may be applied to the merits.  ACEVES, supra note 67, 
at 593–94. 
 78  Id. at 673.  
 79  Id. at 680–81 (“Thus only a remedy tailored to effectuate the purposes of the 
international guarantees of human rights is consistent with the concurrence of the 
nations that torture is absolutely forbidden and that its practices violates international 
law.  In such a setting, it is clear that the needs of the international community can be 
met not by mere application of the law of one or another nation state having an 
interest in the matter, but by an application of the law directed by international 
principles and practice itself.”).  
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nations’ or merely a wrong actionable under the law of the appropriate 
sovereign state”80 firmly in favor of international law, even quoting 
favorably the Second Circuit’s language about the torturer as hostis 
humani generis and noting that “[w]e are dealing not with an ordinary 
case of assault and battery.”81 
The continued influence of the Filártiga formulation shows up in 
the important concurring opinion by Judge Edwards of the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.82  The 
plaintiffs in Tel-Oren were the family members and survivors of the 1978 
attack by members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on 
civilians in Israel.83  The militants from the PLO pulled vehicles off a 
road, held the passengers captive, and tortured some and killed others, 
before Israeli police finally stopped them.84  The district court 
dismissed the case, and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
dismissal.85  In his concurring opinion, Judge Edwards noted that he 
agreed with the dismissal because the PLO, as a non-state entity, could 
not have the same obligations under international law as states.86  He 
felt compelled, however, to write a concurring opinion setting out his 
conclusion that the ATS would provide a cause of action given different 
facts, in contrast to Judge Bork who believed it would not.87  Judge 
 
 80  Id. at 74.  William J. Aceves also noted: 
In order to take the international condemnation of torture 
seriously this court must adopt a remedy appropriate to the ends 
and reflective of the nature of the condemnation.  Torture is 
viewed with universal abhorrence; the prohibition of torture by 
international consensus and express international accords is clear 
and unambiguous; and, “for purposes of civil liability, the torturer 
has become—like the pirate and the slave trader before him—
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”  We are dealing 
not with an ordinary case of assault and battery.  If the courts of 
the United States are to adhere to the consensus of the 
community of humankind, any remedy they fashion must 
recognize that this case concerns an act so monstrous as to make 
the perpetrator an outlaw around the globe.   
Id. at 748 (emphasis added) (citing Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 884, 888, 890).  
 81  Id. at 748. 
 82  726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 83  Id. at 774. 
 84  Id. at 775–77. 
 85  Id. at 775 (majority opinion) (per curiam); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 551 (D.D.C. 1981).  
 86  Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791 (Edwards, J., concurring).  
 87  Id. at 775 (“I write separately to underscore the rationale for my decision; I do 
this because, as will be apparent, there are sharp differences of viewpoint among the 
judges who have grappled with these cases over the meaning and application of 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).”). 
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Edwards ultimately agreed with the Filártiga approach, quoting (yet 
again) its characterization of the torturer (along with pirates and slave 
traders) as hostis humani generis88 in support of the conclusion that 
international law from time to time produces norms of such strength 
and subject to such common consensus that they would give rise to civil 
liability.89  Although conceding that he preferred to apply international 
law to ATS cases, Judge Edwards acknowledged that doing so would 
saddle federal judges with the immense burden of deriving specific 
standards of liability from an amorphous body of law.90  He therefore 
offered an alternative formulation, under which the ATS would be 
merely the jurisdictional hook, and judges would apply tort law to the 
merits.91 
The district court in Xuncax v. Gramajo92 closely compared the 
international law and municipal law approaches outlined by Judge 
Edwards in Tel-Oren, the latter of which had also been applied by the 
Ninth Circuit only a year earlier.93  The plaintiffs in Xuncax were 
indigenous persons from Guatemala who had either been tortured by 
Guatemalan security forces or whose family members were tortured—
sometimes to death—by those same forces.94  They sued Hector 
Gramajo, the former Minister of Defense and, before that, commander 
of the military division with authority over their home region.95  In 
rejecting the application of domestic law in favor of international law, 
 
 88  Id. at 781 (“The reference to piracy and slave-trading is not fortuitous.  
Historically these offenses held a special place in the law of nations: their perpetrators, 
dubbed enemies of all mankind, were susceptible to prosecution by any nation 
capturing them.”). 
 89  Id. (“The inference is that persons may be susceptible to civil liability if they 
commit either a crime traditionally warranting universal jurisdiction or an offense that 
comparably violates current norms of international law.”).  Judge Edwards went 
further, identifying candidates for inclusion in the law of nations, understood in this 
context to consist of norms of sufficient strength and universality.  These included “(a) 
genocide; (b) slavery or slave trade; (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of 
individuals; (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment; (e) prolonged arbitrary detention; (f) systematic racial discrimination; 
(g) consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”  
Id. 
 90  Id. (stating that “[w]hile [the Filártiga formulation] approach is consistent with 
the language of section 1350, it places an awesome duty on federal district courts to 
derive from an amorphous entity—i.e., the ‘law of nations’—standards of liability 
applicable in concrete situations”). 
 91  Id. at 782. 
 92  886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).  
 93  See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1476 n.10 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 94  Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 169 (D. Mass. 1995).  
 95  Id. at 171. 
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the court weighed several factors, including fidelity to the plain 
language of the statute, the amount of flexibility a solution under 
international law would afford the courts, and the ability of the federal 
judiciary to shoulder the interpretive burden described by Judge 
Edwards.96  In a passage especially important in the present context, 
the court discussed the difference between applying tort law and 
international law: 
[L]ooking to domestic tort law to provide the cause of action 
mutes the grave international law aspect of the tort, reducing 
it to no more (or less) than a garden-variety municipal tort.  
This is not merely a question of formalism or even of the 
amount or type of damages available; rather it concerns the 
proper characterization of the kind of wrongs meant to be 
addressed under § 1350: those perpetrated by hostis humani 
generis (“enemies of all humankind”) in contravention of jus 
cogens (peremptory norms of international law).  In this light, 
municipal tort law is an inadequate placeholder for such 
values.97 
The Filártiga formulation became so cemented, and the 
application of international law so well-accepted by courts, that by the 
time the Supreme Court finally considered the ATS, the question of 
using it as a grant of jurisdiction and relying on tort law as the rule of 
decision did not even come up.  In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court 
decided that while the ATS was purely jurisdictional and did not itself 
create a cause of action, at least some wrongs under international law 
entered the common law and would provide the cause of action to go 
along with the jurisdictional grant of the ATS.98  Urging judicial 
restraint in making new common law, the Court held “that federal 
courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law 
for violations of any international law norm with less definite content 
and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms 
familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”99  Although the Court did not 
specify which norms would make the cut, it suggested that the 
standards articulated by earlier courts, such as hostis humani generis, 
 
 96  Id. at 181–84. 
 97  Id. at 183.  
 98  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). 
 99  Id.; see also Michael Wells et al., Why Constitutional Torts Deserve a Book of Their 
Own, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857, 857 (1999) (“Over thirty years ago, Marshall Shapo 
coined the term ‘constitutional tort’ to denote a suit brought against an official, 
charging a constitutional violation and seeking damages.”).  
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would serve as a useful guide.100  Although the Court favorably cited 
Judge Edwards’s Tel-Oren concurrence,101 its understanding was 
certainly more restrictive than his.102 
Whatever the limitations and whatever the identity of the norms 
that comprised the set of the law of nations as it existed in the federal 
common law, the Supreme Court in Sosa cemented the role of 
international law in deciding ATS cases.  The Court thereby confirmed 
the Second Circuit’s creation of a new “public tort” analogous to the 
“constitutional torts” the Court had recognized in the previous two 
decades.103 
B. The Impact of ATS Litigation 
ATS cases have changed the legal landscape in ways that are 
important and worth preserving.104  They provide individual victims 
with a way to pursue accountability (albeit in the form of civil liability) 
for the specific person(s) who violated their rights.  The impact of that 
development is difficult to overstate.  Despite the comparatively recent 
rise of individual rights under international law,105 individual remedies 
remain elusive even today.  These remedies were almost entirely 
unknown in 1980 when the Second Circuit decided Filártiga.  Although 
individuals today have more options available for seeking judicial106 (or 
 
 100  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (“This limit upon judicial recognition is generally 
consistent with the reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue 
before it reached this Court.”); Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(“[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave 
trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”). 
 101  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 886.  
 102  Judge Edwards included indefinite detention in his list of possible offenses that 
would give rise to civil liability.  Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 103  See infra Part II.C. 
 104  See generally Koh, supra note 18. 
 105  The international community manifested its moral commitment to the 
protection of individual rights with the unanimous passage of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly in 1948, and its legal 
commitment to the same principles with the entry into force of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1976 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1976.  See ICCPR, supra note 7; ICESCR, supra 
note 7; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 106  Today, victims may bring human rights cases before the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights.  Of the three, only the ECHR was active in the 
early days of ATS litigation in the United States.  And while international human rights 
adjudication is an important advancement, these three tribunals cannot possibly 
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at least institutional)107 declarations that state conduct violates human 
rights law, mechanisms other than the ATS for seeking individual 
accountability—outside the trials of a few dozen defendants in 
international criminal trials over the last twenty years—are vanishingly 
rare.108 
ATS cases also provide international law with a much sought-after 
enforcement mechanism.  The dearth of such mechanisms (alleviated 
somewhat but not eliminated in recent years)109 is in tension with 
international human rights law’s emphasis on remedies for victims and 
accountability for individual perpetrators of human rights abuses.110  
Many international instruments, including treaties to which the United 
States is a party, provide for both remedies and accountability, and 
further place the burden for providing them squarely on states.111  The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), for instance, states 
that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted 
him by the constitution or by law.”112  The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights requires each state party to provide victims 
with an effective, officially determined, and enforceable remedy.113  
 
shoulder the burden of being the only available forums.  Indeed, by their own terms, 
these courts prefer enforcement in domestic courts.  See How the Court Works, EUR. CT. 
HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/howitworks&c= (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2015), for an explanation of how the ECHR processes cases and an 
overview of its budget.  
 107  Most of the major human rights treaties are overseen by UN committees.  In 
some instances, those committees may hear individual complaints from citizens of 
countries that have elected to allow such complaints.  The committees in such 
instances, however, only have the power to declare that the complaining party’s rights 
were violated but not to order remedies.  See Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/ 
HRTBPetitions.aspx#individualcomm (last visited Dec. 29, 2015).  
 108  That is not to say that individual remedies or some measure of individual 
accountability are nonexistent.   
 109  See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 110  See infra Part III.B. 
 111  Gwynne L. Skinner, Roadblocks to Remedies: Recently Developed Barriers to Relief for 
Aliens Injured by U.S. Officials, Contrary to the Founders’ Intent, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 555, 569 
(2013). 
 112  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 105; see also GWYNNE SKINNER 
ET AL., THE THIRD PILLAR: ACCESS TO JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
BY TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS (Dec. 2013), https://willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/faculty/ 
The%20Third%20Pillar%20hi%20res%20FINAL.pdf.  
 113  ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 2 states:  
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:  
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein 
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, 
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The Convention Against Torture is even more specific, requiring states 
to ensure, through their domestic legal systems, that “the victim of an 
act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and 
adequate compensation”;114 that “competent authorities proceed to a 
prompt and impartial investigation” of allegations of torture;115 and 
that perpetrators of torture be prosecuted or extradited.116  Even 
international tribunals that hear cases brought by individuals against 
states evince a structural preference for domestic enforcement.117  ATS 
cases provided a way to pursue that enforcement in a way that very few 
other legal mechanisms in the world do.118 
ATS cases give judges in the United States the opportunity to 
participate in the global conversation that shapes transnational legal 
norms—norms increasing in scope and character.119  Law, even in areas 
 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity;  
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have 
his right thereto determined by competent judicial, 
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other 
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, 
and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;  
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such 
remedies when granted. 
 114  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) art. 14, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 
(Dec. 10, 1984), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx.  
 115  Id. art. 12.  
 116  Id. arts. 6–7.  
 117  In human rights courts, where individuals may bring cases against states, that 
preference is expressed through the doctrine of the exhaustion of domestic remedies.  
See generally ANTONIO AUGUSTO CANCADO TRINDADE, THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF 
EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ITS RATIONALE IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (1983).  In the context of individual 
international criminal liability, the International Criminal Court (ICC) self-
consciously departed from the positioning of its predecessors as hierarchically 
superior to domestic courts and adopted the principle of complementarity, which 
permits the ICC to exercise jurisdiction only in the absence of good faith investigations 
at the national level.  See Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the 
Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 
386 (1998) (“[C]omplementarity would replace the primacy of international tribunals 
with priority for national courts.”).   
 118  See Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law 
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 
1, 32 (2002) (“No other legal system has a comparable statute.”).  That is not to say 
that ATS cases are unique in the world.  See Robert McCorquodale, Waving Not 
Drowning: Kiobel Outside the United States, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 846, 846–51 (2013). 
 119  See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
37 (1993); see also Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005); Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the 
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usually thought of as purely domestic, is no longer formed and applied 
exclusively within the closed borders of the sovereign state.120  Much 
ink has been spilled over the question of whether, and to what extent, 
the United States should internalize the norms of international law.121  
Global legal norms, however, are not static entities such that the 
United States can only incorporate them wholesale or leave them 
alone.  They change, emerge, and evolve in part through international 
judicial conversation.122  Human rights litigation places judges in the 
United States inside that conversation and thereby gives them a role in 
the ongoing creation and development of international and 
transnational legal norms.123 
Civil litigation in general, and ATS cases in particular, provide a 
cutting-edge mechanism for victims to pursue MNEs that may have 
committed or been complicit in human rights abuses.  While it is true 
that only states have international legal obligations, with the exception 
of individuals under international criminal law, MNEs increasingly 
wield power equal to—if not surpassing—many states and have shown 
themselves capable of conduct and harms that, if committed by a state, 
would qualify as grave violations of human rights law.124  In the past 
decade, the topic of “business and human rights” has garnered much 
attention from officials, advocates, and academics.  As a result of that 
attention, major institutions such as the UN and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have promulgated 
new norms urging MNEs to comply with international human rights 
standards.125  While these high-profile initiatives have generated 
 
Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 425 (1999).  
 120  See generally Shapiro, supra note 119.  
 121  See infra Part IV.A. 
 122  Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1123 (2000). 
 123  Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial 
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 558 (2005). 
 124  Major ecological catastrophes are a clear example of this phenomenon.  But 
corporations engage in a wide variety of behavior that would qualify as human rights 
abuses if they were states, such as forced evictions and suppression of free speech and 
association.  See, e.g., Whose Development?: Human Rights Abuses in Sierra Leone’s Mining 
Boom, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2014/02/ 
19/whose-development-0; “They Know Everything We Do”: Telecom and Internet 
Surveillance in Ethiopia, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/2014/03/25/they-know-everything-we-do.  
 125  See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011), http://www.oecd.org/ 
corporate/mne/48004323.pdf; UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMM’R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE 
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ongoing momentum,126 the only complaint procedure created so far is 
a soft-law process under the OECD, which allows individuals or 
organizations to initiate a non-binding mediation process against 
MNEs for failing to comply with the OECD’s guidelines.127  Civil 
litigation offers a hard-law alternative to such soft-law mechanisms, 
thereby improving the chance that plaintiffs will actually recover 
damage awards (or settlements); that MNEs will actually modify their 
behavior to conform more closely to human rights standards; and that 
MNEs will contribute more effectively to democratic development in 
the countries in which they operate.128 
Finally, bringing human rights into U.S. courts on behalf of 
foreign plaintiffs makes the power of the human rights vocabulary and 
concepts more widely available to domestic public interest advocates.129  
Although the United States has long been a supporter of human rights 
abroad, the rhetoric of the international human rights movement has 
historically struggled to find footing within the United States.130  Today, 
 
UNITED NATIONS “PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK (2011), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.
pdf.  
 126  A UN working group continues to engage both states and businesses in the 
development and application of the Guiding Principles. 
 127  See The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD WATCH, 
http://oecdwatch.org/oecd-guidelines (last visited Dec. 21, 2015) for a description of 
the complaint procedure.  See Skinner, supra note 111, for an excellent and 
comprehensive treatment of the ways in which advocates have sought judicial remedies 
against corporations for human rights abuses and the obstacles they commonly face.  
 128  See Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity 
Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. 
J. 207, 223 (2008) (“A corporation that abets human rights abuses will not impart 
democratic values or provide a model for positive change.”).  It is important to note 
in the context of the discussion of MNEs that international human rights law and the 
law applied in ATS cases—and, by extension, the argument presented in this Article—
are only concerned with the conduct of MNEs insofar as that conduct was undertaken 
in conjunction with (e.g., conspiring, aiding, or abetting) states.  Only states may 
violate international law, and only state action triggers the public/private distinction 
advanced herein.  This Article does not take a position on the much more difficult 
question of whether the power of MNEs and their consequent ability to visit the same 
magnitude of harms as states can or should cause us to treat them differently than 
other private actors.  
 129  See The Bringing Human Rights Home Lawyers’ Network, COLUM. L. SCH. HUM. RTS. 
INST., http://web.law.columbia.edu/human-rights-institute/bhrh-lawyers-network 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Human Rights Institute].  The Bringing 
Human Rights Home Lawyers’ Network has proven invaluable and provided several 
“big wins.”  Domestic advocates have learned to use transnational public relations 
strategies to advance their goals.  Chicago police torture cases are examples of other 
notable successes of Bringing Human Rights Home.   
 130  See BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME x (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2007) (“[B]y 
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however, domestic advocacy using the language of international 
human rights is commonplace,131 as is using international forums to 
catalyze domestic social change.132  ATS litigation played a key role in 
that resurgence by educating U.S. lawyers and judges in international 
law, who in turn disseminated the lessons to their peers engaged in 
“purely” domestic advocacy.133  In that sense, ATS provided an entry 
point into U.S. social justice discourse for the rhetoric and techniques 
of international human rights advocacy. 
All of the foregoing advantages of transnational public law 
litigation (TPL) depend on the admixture of private and public 
litigation and are therefore imperiled to the extent that the public law 
aspects of human rights litigation (international law) are exchanged 
for a purely private approach (torts). 
C. Private Rights for Public Wrongs 
The story of the emergence of human rights litigation in U.S. 
courts is also the broader story of the emergence of the idea of private 
rights of action for public wrongs.  By explicitly rejecting “garden 
variety municipal torts” as inadequate and instead embracing 
international law as the rule of decision in ATS cases, advocates and 
courts fashioned the third “public tort” in twenty years.  The first 
successful modern ATS case, filed in 1979, was preceded by the 
Supreme Court’s 1961 decision creating “constitutional torts” in 
 
the 1950s the separation between international human rights and domestic civil rights 
appeared complete.”). 
 131  The Human Rights Institute at Columbia University, for example, maintains 
The Bringing Human Rights Home Lawyers’ Network, a large and active group of 
activists seeking to use international human rights norms in domestic social justice 
advocacy.  See Human Rights Institute, supra note 129.  
 132  Many domestic advocacy organizations, for instance, prepare reports to the 
United Nations when it periodically reviews the performance by the United States of 
its obligations under human rights treaties.  In 2013, for instance, more than forty-
seven civil society organizations in the United States submitted reports to the Human 
Rights Committee detailing ways in which the United States violates its obligations 
under the ICCPR.  See ICCPR Newsletter No. 2: List of Issues Submissions, U.S. HUM. RTS. 
NETWORK, http://www.ushrnetwork.org/news-updates/iccpr-newsletter-no-2-list-
issues-submissions (last visited Oct. 21, 2015).  
 133  See BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME, supra note 130, at 217–19 (“ATS cases 
concerning human rights abuses abroad have required federal judges to apply (and 
thus learn about) international human rights law.  The cases have played an important 
role in educating U.S. lawyers and judges about international human rights law and 
building case law on which they can rely.”). 
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Monroe,134 which reimagined § 1983,135 and its 1971 decision in Bivens,136 
which recognized a right of action for damages against federal officials 
violating constitutional rights.  Those cases and their progeny set the 
precedent for the application of private law remedies to breaches of 
public duty (constitutional rights) later built on by ATS cases for 
breaches of a different public duty (international law).  It is important 
to note that the argument here is not that early ATS cases explicitly 
drew on Monroe or Bivens to reach their decisions.  Rather it is to make 
the point, as have other commentators, that the three types of cases—
§ 1983, Bivens, and ATS—are similar enough to group together into 
the category of “public torts.”137 
It is important to note here that § 1983 allows for claims in equity 
as well as for damages.  The former conforms more closely to the 
public law litigation model (discussed infra) while the latter—like 
Bivens actions and ATS cases—mix private remedies and public harms.  
 
 134  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).  See supra note 53 for further 
explanations regarding the “overruling” of Monroe.  See generally Sheldon Nahmod, 
Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1721–25 
(1989) (describing the origins of tort rhetoric in constitutional tort actions). 
 135   42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).  
 136  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
 137  See, e.g., Koh, supra note 18, at 2347–48 (“Like its domestic counterpart 
(christened fifteen years ago by Abram Chayes), transnational public law litigation 
seeks to vindicate public rights and values through judicial remedies.  In both settings, 
parties bring ‘public actions,’ asking courts to declare and explicate public norms, 
often with the goal of provoking institutional reform.  Much as domestic public law 
litigants have pursued Bivens and § 1983 litigation in federal courts seeking redress, 
deterrence, and reform of state and federal institutions through judicial enunciation 
of constitutional norms, transnational public law litigants have sought redress, 
deterrence, and reform of national governmental policies through clarification of 
rules of international conduct.”).  See also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388; William Casto, The 
New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS 
L.J. 635, 645 (2006) (explaining that “[b]ecause ATS litigation in Sosa’s wake is so 
obviously analogous to Bivens litigation, the same caution is pertinent to crafting tort 
remedies for violations of international law”).  Casto characterizes all three types of 
claims as “mosaic actions,” meaning that the cause of action (norm) generally comes 
from one body of law while the remedy comes from another.  In other words, “mosaic 
actions” are causes of action made up of a patchwork of different legal systems and 
rules.  Id. at 640 (“In each case [with litigation involving § 1983 or ATS] the norm to 
be remedied comes from one body of law—the Constitution in one; international law 
in the other—while the remedy comes from a different source—the Congress in § 
1983 litigation; the federal courts in ATS litigation.  When the norm and remedy are 
joined, a cause of action is created.”  Additionally, “[l]ike in ATS litigation, the norm 
in Bivens that made the defendant’s conduct illegal came from one body of law, the 
Constitution, and the federal judiciary supplied the remedy through judicial 
legislation.”). 
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The term “constitutional torts” is usually taken to encompass both 
equity and damage actions under § 1983.  But since the latter is more 
important to the argument presented in this Article, the term will be 
used to refer, collectively, to Bivens actions and claims for damages 
under § 1983 but to exclude equity claims under § 1983. 
Several features of classical private litigation were upended by the 
rise in the mid-twentieth century of what commentators came to call 
“public law litigation.”138  Private lawsuits under the classical model had 
been understood to be primarily bipolar, in the sense that they 
involved two opposed parties whose interests were similarly opposed.139  
Court cases were zero-sum, winner-take-all affairs.140  A gain for one of 
the bipolar parties was a loss for the other.  Litigation was aimed at 
retrospective relief.141  The available remedies were inextricably linked 
to the nature of the harm.142  For instance, the compensation available 
for a breach of contract would be linked to plaintiff’s loss, and the 
damages in tort would be linked to the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries.  
Lawsuits were self-contained in the sense that they were aimed only at 
resolving the immediate dispute between the parties by payment, 
performance, or enforcement of the status quo without further 
involvement by the court.143  Finally, the parties to the dispute would 
have both initiated and controlled the lawsuit, serving as the fact-
finders while the trial court judge served as a neutral arbiter.144 
Public law litigation broke away from each element of the classical 
model.  Brown v. Board of Education serves as an excellent example of 
that rupture.  Brown explicitly sought to advance the interests of all 
black schoolchildren.145  It did so through the class action mechanism, 
but other cases at the time arrived at similarly broad representation 
directly, by taking advantage of newly relaxed joinder rules, and 
indirectly, by attempting to exert systemic influence through statutory 
and constitutional interpretations.146  Furthermore, the aims of Brown 
 
 138  Harvard Law Professor Abram Chayes coined the term in an influential article 
published in 1976.  See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1976). 
 139  Id. at 1282.  
 140  Id.  
 141  Id.  
 142  Id. at 1282–83.  
 143  Id. at 1283.  
 144  Chayes, supra note 138, at 1283.  
 145  See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 146  Chayes, supra note 138, at 1284 (“School desegregation, employment 
discrimination, and prisoners’ or inmates’ rights cases come readily to mind as avatars 
of this new form of litigation.  But it would be mistaken to suppose that it is confined 
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were prospective, in addition to retrospective.  Plaintiffs were not 
simply seeking compensation for past injuries, but also judicial 
protection from similar future injuries.147  They sought a fundamental 
change in the way the government operated.  That fundamental 
change came by way of an injunction; the increased reliance on equity 
in public law litigation severed the strong link in private law litigation 
between the right and the remedy since an injunction necessarily deals 
with contingencies and future probabilities.  By definition, the 
ongoing and systemic nature of the injunction in Brown meant that the 
litigation was not self-contained in the sense that the issue was disposed 
of by a single act (such as payment of damages) such that the judge’s 
attention was freed for other things.  Rather, it required significant and 
ongoing judicial attention. 
Constitutional torts, like ATS cases, combine elements of the 
models of classical private litigation and modern public law litigation 
into a hybrid, or “mosaic,” action.148  They link public norms with the 
private remedy of damages.149  The litigation is bipolar (private) in the 
sense that it involves two individual parties, yet they are not the same 
type of party.  One is a public agent while the other is not, and their 
interests are therefore not as symmetrically opposed as those of two 
private parties.  While the litigation is retrospective, about an 
“identified set of completed events”150 (private), it is also prospective, 
seeking “norm enunciation”151 and institutional change (public).  
Unlike public law litigation, however, where equitable remedies break 
the traditional link between right and remedy, public tort litigation 
restores that link by seeking damages derived from the harm suffered.  
In that sense, public tort cases are self-contained; the judge’s 
involvement ends with ordering or denying damages.  She will not 
become embroiled in managing a long-running and complex social 
program, such as school desegregation, or an environmental cleanup.  
Nor will she be called on, in either the merits or the remedial phase, 
to play a significant role in fact-finding. 
 
 
to these areas.  Antitrust, securities fraud and other aspects of the conduct of corporate 
business, bankruptcy and reorganizations, union governance, consumer fraud, 
housing discrimination, electoral reapportionment, environmental management—
cases in all these fields display in varying degrees the features of public law litigation.”). 
 147  Id. 
 148  Casto, supra note 137, at 639–41. 
 149  Id. at 640. 
 150  Chayes, supra note 138, at 1282.  
 151  Koh, supra note 18, at 2349. 
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The most important aspect of public torts in the present context 
is the decision of the courts to supplant private law with public law as 
the rule of decision, while retaining the bipolar structure and remedies 
of private litigation.152  Briefly examining the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in justifying the creation of constitutional torts in Monroe 
and Bivens will help to illuminate what is at stake in deciding whether 
to translate human rights abuses into tort claims.  In Monroe, thirteen 
Chicago police officers entered the Monroe home—without a warrant 
or probable cause—and forced the six members of the family to stand 
naked in the living room while they ransacked the house in search of 
evidence related to a recent murder.153  The police then detained Mr. 
Monroe, the father, for an additional ten hours of interrogation, 
denied him access to an attorney, and then finally released him without 
charges.  In Justice Douglas’s majority opinion, the Supreme Court 
held that plaintiffs retained a federal cause of action for violations of 
their constitutional rights by state officials acting under color of state 
law even if that state’s common law of torts already provided a 
remedy.154 
By explicitly making the federal remedy available, even if a 
remedy in tort was available in state courts, Justice Douglas implicitly 
established a preference for the constitutional approach over the 
common law one.  Much of the reasoning in the opinion rested on the 
legislative history of § 1983 and the historical background against 
which it had been enacted.155  In the aftermath of the Civil War, lawless 
state officials allowed the Ku Klux Klan to engage in open campaigns 
of violence.  But Justice Douglas did not base the Court’s opinion in 
1961 on the existence of the kind of lawlessness at the state level that 
existed in 1871.  Quite the opposite, the Court held that “[t]he federal 
 
 152  In a sense, Filártiga can be read as a contest over the enforcement of the bright-
line classical separation of private from public claims.  As the defense noted at the 
initial trial:  
[P]laintiffs appear to confuse the whole of international law, which may 
very well concern itself with private claims, with the law of nations, which 
governs “questions of right between nations.”  In clear and obvious 
terms, § 1350 grants federal jurisdiction only over torts committed “in 
violation of the law of nations.”  It does not purport, either expressly or 
otherwise, to bestow jurisdiction over claims based on private 
international law.  Insofar as plaintiffs’ claim sounds in the latter, it 
cannot be heard in a federal forum. 
ACEVES, supra note 67, at 526 (citations omitted). 
 153  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).  See supra note 53 for explanations 
regarding the “overruling” of Monroe. 
 154  Id. at 183. 
 155  Id. at 17280. 
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remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not 
be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”156  While 
the majority opinion is silent on why that federal remedy might be 
preferred, even to practically available (as opposed to theoretically 
available) state remedies, the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan 
anchors the preference, in part, on the insufficiency of at least some 
state remedies for at least some deprivations of constitutional rights.157  
Justice Douglas did not, however, completely remove torts from the 
picture, noting in an influential dictum that § 1983 “should be read 
against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible 
for the natural consequences of his actions.”158  The precise 
relationship of tort concepts to § 1983 actions continues to confound 
courts and scholars, but it is clear that some relationship exists and that 
both are, in one way or another, at play.159 
In contrast to ATS and § 1983 claims, which were provided for by 
statute, the Court in Bivens derived an implied right of action from the 
importance of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the need 
to provide a remedy for the unique harm that occurs when an agent of 
the government violates those rights.160  The case arose when federal 
agents stormed the plaintiff’s house without a warrant and arrested 
him after humiliating him in front of his wife and children.161  His 
home was searched before he was taken into custody where he was 
interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search.162  In the 
 
 156  Id. at 183.  
 157  Id. at 196 n.5. (“There will be many cases in which the relief provided by the 
state to the victim of a use of state power which the state either did not or could not 
constitutionally authorize will be far less than what Congress may have thought would 
be fair reimbursement for deprivation of a constitutional right . . . . It would indeed 
be the purest coincidence if the state remedies for violations of common law rights by 
private citizens were fully appropriate to redress those injuries which only a state 
official can cause and against which the Constitution provides protection.”) (Harlan, 
J., concurring).   
 158  Id. at 187 (majority opinion). 
 159  See, e.g., Sheldon H. Nahmod, Section 1983 and the “Background” of Tort Liability, 
50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974); Michael L. Wells, Civil Recourse, Damages-As-Redress, and 
Constitutional Law, 46 GA. L. REV. 1003 (2012); Christina B. Whitman, Constitutional 
Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980). 
 160  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 390 (1971).  Justice Douglas noted the following, citing Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion in Monroe: “The injuries inflicted by officials acting under color of 
law, while no less compensable in damages than those inflicted by private parties, are 
substantially different in kind, as the Court’s opinion today discusses in detail.”  Id. at 
409 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 195 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 161  Id. at 389–90. 
 162  Id. at 390.  Bivens asserted that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
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Supreme Court, the government argued that privacy interests 
protected by the common law were at stake in the case, as opposed to 
constitutional rights, and that the case would therefore be properly 
resolved in state court under the common law of torts.163 
The Court disagreed, emphasizing the difference between the 
relationship of a citizen to the state and the relationships among 
private individuals: 
Respondents seek to treat the relationship between a citizen 
and a federal agent unconstitutionally exercising his 
authority as no different from the relationship between two 
private citizens.  In so doing, they ignore the fact that power, 
once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when it is 
wrongfully used.  An agent acting—albeit 
unconstitutionally—in the name of the United States 
possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual 
trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.164 
Indeed, the Court went on to note that the relationships are so 
fundamentally different that “[t]he interests protected by state laws 
regulating trespass and the invasion of privacy, and those protected by 
the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, may be inconsistent or even hostile.”165  Thus, the Court 
in Bivens declared explicitly what it had only hinted at in Monroe: that 
certain harms caused by public officials can only properly be treated as 
violations of the public law even if the same harm, caused by a private 
person, would be susceptible to claims under private law.166 
 Hence the Court conceived of constitutional torts as not only 
offering plaintiffs a way to be compensated for the harms they suffered, 
but also as engaging in the project of redrawing or reinforcing the 
appropriate lines between the exercise of state power and the 
protection of individual rights.167  The latter became the defining 
project of the civil rights era. 
 
because the arrest occurred with an unreasonable amount of force and made without 
probable cause. Id.  He also claimed that he suffered great humiliation, 
embarrassment and mental suffering as a result of the unlawful conduct.  Id. 
 163  Id.  
 164  Id. at 391–92. 
 165  Id. at 394. 
 166  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394.  As Justice Douglas noted, citing Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion in Monroe, “The injuries inflicted by officials acting under color of 
law, while no less compensable in damages than those inflicted by private parties, are 
substantially different in kind, as the Court’s opinion today discusses in detail.”  Id. at 
409 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 195 (Harlan, J., concurring)).  
 167  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 39192.   
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Of course, the choice to create public torts (the constitutional 
torts of Monroe and Bivens and the public international torts of the 
ATS) can be understood as a matter of preference, depending on 
which bundles of goods might be produced by which tactics and trial 
strategies.  Will torts versus human rights result in a higher chance of 
a favorable verdict and award?  How does that balance against the 
potential loss of the moral victory afforded by a judicial 
pronouncement that the defendant violated human rights standards?  
In that sense, perhaps the courts in public torts cases were only 
expressing a contingent, all-things-considered preference for public 
law over private law when they repeatedly chose the former over the 
latter.  Yet that reading seems to ignore the strength of the courts’ 
language, the way their creation of public torts stemmed from a sense 
of obligation, and their sense of themselves as engaged in drawing the 
boundaries of acceptable exercises of state power against individuals. 
If, as suggested by the courts’ language, there is a strong 
normative justification for preferring public law to private law as the 
rule of decision in public torts, then the notion of translating human 
rights claims into the language of torts becomes less of a tactical 
balancing act and more an approach that, having been considered, 
should be abandoned or at the least seriously questioned.168  Part III of 
this Article will advance such a strong normative justification, showing 
that the notion of equality that permeates the law of torts is wholly 
inadequate for redressing public harms.  Since that argument 
questions the project of translating human rights claims into torts, Part 
IV will offer a novel alternative to translation. 
III. CLASH OF NORMATIVITIES 
What was behind the courts’ preference for the language of 
international law, or constitutional rights, over that of torts?  What did 
Justice Brennan mean in Bivens when he said that “[a]n agent acting—
albeit unconstitutionally—in the name of the United States possesses 
a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising 
 
 168  Having said that, injured plaintiffs, particularly those who are the victims of 
human rights abuses, should not be held hostage to the normative prescriptions of 
legal scholars.  To the extent that a claimant seeks only compensation for her injuries, 
nothing should prevent her from securing that compensation through whatever legal 
avenues might be available to her.  This Article rather proceeds on the assumption 
that at least some plaintiffs and advocates intend to pursue human rights claims in 
state courts in order to achieve at least some of the broader, systemic results such 
litigation has been aimed at in the past.  It is to the latter group that the argument 
herein is directed. 
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no authority other than his own[?]”  If the injuries in either case would 
be the same, what is the source of the greater harm in the case of a 
violation of rights by an agent of the state? 
A. The Inevitably Public and Political Commitment to Torture 
1. A Problem with the Rule of Law 
The first hint of an answer can be found by examining the mistake 
commentators make in the commonly repeated assertion that 
“[a]lmost every international law violation is also an intentional tort.  
Torture is assault and battery.  Terrorism is wrongful death.  Slavery is 
false imprisonment.”169  While torture may encompass, among other 
things, acts of assault and/or battery, the reverse is not true.  Assault 
does not encompass torture.  At the most basic level, this difference 
can be appreciated by comparing the legal definitions of the two 
wrongs.  The common law tort of battery is usually defined as the 
intentional causation of harmful or offensive contact with another 
person without that person’s consent.170  A common definition of 
torture is: 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or 
a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third 
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.171 
On a purely textual level, then, it becomes clear that battery fits neatly 
into the definition of torture but not vice-versa; the definition of 
battery lacks, among other features of torture, the requirement that 
the act(s) be undertaken by a public official pursuant to a program of 
punishment, interrogation, intimidation, or discrimination.  There are 
other salient differences.  While the statute of limitations for battery 
varies from state to state, two years is common.172  Under U.S. law, the 
 
 169  Alford, supra note 4, at 1750.  
 170  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965). 
 171  CAT, supra note 114, art. 1.   
 172  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 335.1, 349.4 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
243 (2015).  
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statute of limitations for a torture claim is ten years,173 while under 
international law there is no statute of limitations.174 
There must be strong public reasons to justify the different 
standards of liability imposed under international law and under most 
domestic systems for public officials who violate international human 
rights law and private citizens who commit torts.  Without these 
reasons, human rights laws—at least those with tort analogues—may 
be void on rule of law grounds.  Analyzing the rule-of-law issues raised 
by the translation project will show that any legal system which 
proscribes human rights abuses qua human rights abuses necessarily 
commits itself to at least a weak version of the typically Continental 
view that individuals exercising a public function are, legally at least, 
categorically different that private actors pursuing private ends.  
Among other things, the rule of law requires that laws be general in 
the sense that they apply equally to everyone.175  The precise contours 
of the principle of generality are contested, but most commentators 
would agree that a law imposing different standards of liability on 
different classes of citizens for the same acts without adequate 
justification fails to satisfy the requirement.176  In comparing human 
rights abuses and tort harms, the question then becomes why it might 
be the case that a public official tortures while a private citizen batters.  
The answer to that question will provide the first step in the normative 
argument against translating human rights abuses into tort harms. 
It is clearly the character of the individual undertaking the 
conduct designated “torture,” rather than the nature of the conduct 
itself, that must provide the justifiable distinction if one is to be 
 
 173  See TVPA, supra note 31.  
 174  CAT is silent in the issue of any limitation on the time within which victims must 
claim redress, but the Committee against Torture has addressed the issue.  See Comm. 
Against Torture, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 9, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/3 (Nov. 19, 2012), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/GC/CAT-C-GC-3_en.pdf (“On 
account of the continuous nature of the effects of torture, statutes of limitations should 
not be applicable as these deprive victims of the redress, compensation, and 
rehabilitation due to them.”).  
 175  See Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1021, 1036–45 
(2014). 
 176  H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
624 (1958); see, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 237 (Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 
1999) (also giving “like cases alike” conceptions of generality).  See also F.S. Royster 
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (“[T]he classification must be 
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair 
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly 
circumstanced shall be treated alike.”).  
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provided at all.  If it were simply a matter of wishing to classify battery 
undertaken in order to interrogate, intimidate, punish, coerce, or 
discriminate (call these forms “battery-plus”) differently than other 
forms of battery (“ordinary” forms of battery, such as getting into a bar 
fight), there would be no need to restrict the class of persons to which 
the law applies.  Indeed if acts of battery-plus were in and of themselves 
more offensive than acts of ordinary battery, lawmakers would have 
every incentive to make enhanced penalties and longer statutes of 
limitation for battery-plus general.  But they are not. 
It must, then, be something in the nature of a public official acting 
in a public capacity that justifies differentiating between torture and 
battery.  This might at first seem puzzling since the Anglo-American 
common law tradition has long treated public officials just like 
ordinary citizens for the purposes of assessing tort liability.177  Civil law 
traditions, by contrast, treat public officials—as representatives of the 
nearly metaphysical entity that is the state—as coordinately superior to 
private individuals.178  Since human rights law by its own terms applies 
only to state actors, maintaining strict adherence to the common law 
tradition of non-differentiation leads to the rule of law problem 
described above.  Any cause of action that singles out public officials, 
such as in Bivens and § 1983 claims, is susceptible to the same problem.  
A resolution to the apparent tension can be found in the theory that 
individuals exercising a public function stand in a different legal 
relationship to others than do individuals acting in their private 
capacity.179 
 Those differing relationships are precisely what makes translating 
human rights abuses into tort harms inapposite.  Specifically, the 
notions of equality that animate tort law and those that animate the 
public law, as well as the scope of the duties generated by each, set 
them too far apart for the latter to be useful in addressing the former. 
 
 177  See generally A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, (8th ed., Macmillan & Co. 1915) (1885).  See also M. Allars, Tort and 
Equity Claims Against the State, in 2 ESSAYS ON LAW AND GOVERNMENT: THE CITIZEN AND 
THE STATE IN THE COURTS 49, 49–100 (Paul Desmond Finn ed., 1996); Peter Cane, 
Damages in Public Law, 9 OTAGO L. REV. 489 (1997–2000). 
 178  See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 94 
(3d ed. 2007) (“In private legal relations [including tort law] the parties were equals 
and the state the referee.  In public legal relations the state was a party, and as 
representative of the public interest (and successor to the prince) it was a party 
superior to the private individual.”).  
 179  See generally Peter Cane, Tort Law and Public Functions, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 148 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014).   
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2. Unequal Equalities 
The operation of the concepts of vertical and horizontal equality, 
defined below, work in diametrically opposite ways when applied to 
private harms than when applied to public harms.  The narrow 
conception of equality on which the private system of tort law rests is 
incompatible with the broader notion of equality at stake when 
addressing public wrongs.  Claims under § 1983, Bivens, and the ATS 
dealt with the incompatibility, albeit incompletely, by specifically 
requiring the application of the public law itself to the merits of the 
case, thereby offering at least the possibility that judicial decisions will 
serve to enunciate norms and to identify a policy or practice that was 
unlawful.180  Tort law, on the other hand, lacks the tools to address that 
incompatibility, and framing human rights violations as “garden 
variety municipal torts” brings the conceptual tension into stark relief. 
There are of course many tort theories, which diverge wildly in 
their understanding of the desired ends of a system of tort law and of 
the optimal institutional arrangements required to achieve those 
ends.181  But one need not adopt any particular perspective to 
understand the problems that arise when treating public wrongs as 
torts because a similar notion of equality underlies most—or at least 
most non-instrumentalist—tort theories.182  A word here about 
nomenclature:  contemporary tort theories fall roughly into two 
categories.  The first derives (often, though not exclusively) from the 
Aristotelean tradition183 and is concerned with “such notions as 
corrective justice, rights, duty, fairness, reciprocity, non-
instrumentalism, and deontology.”184  These tend to focus on 
individuals as the proper locus of analysis.  In the present context, the 
term “rights-based” will suffice to describe this category.185  Theories in 
the second category are concerned more with the systemic attributes 
of the tort law as they relate to the achievement of such moral ends as 
 
  180  See supra Parts II.A–B. 
 181  See PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 179, for an 
excellent overview of the current state of thinking. 
 182 See Stephen Darwall & Julian Darwall, Civil Recourse as Mutual Accountability, 39 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 17, 17 (2011), for the claim that morality underlying tort law is 
equality-based.  See also Ofer Grosskopf, Horizontal Equality and the Law of Torts, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE LAW 357, 357 (Daniel Friedmann ed., 2001) (“In its core, 
tort law clearly reflects a notion of equality; no man is allowed to cause damage to his 
fellow since no one is superior to another.”). 
 183  See ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 99 (1995). 
 184  Stephen Perry, Torts, Rights and Risk, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
LAW OF TORTS, supra note 179, at 38.  
 185  Id.  
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welfare maximization or efficiency.186  This Article will refer to such 
theories as “instrumentalist” (although other names are common, such 
as “economic, functionalist, pragmatist, welfarist, utilitarian, and 
consequentialist”187). 
In both versions, tort law rests on some notion of equality.  But 
“equality” is a hotly contested word that admits of many definitions.  
The most basic understanding of equality is to treat like things alike.  
But that of course begs, at a minimum, the questions of what 
constitutes sufficient similarity to qualify, and what constitutes similar 
treatment for those who do qualify.  In instrumentalist versions, 
equality is a fairly stripped-down idea of two individuals who have the 
same freedom to pursue their own (private) purposes and projects, 
and therefore the same ability to bargain for the costs and benefits of 
that activity.188  Tort law then assigns to judges the role of fixing and 
ensuring the distribution of those costs and benefits. 
Equality in rights-based theories looks at the bundles of rights.  A 
detailed examination of the nature of equality and its relationship to 
tort law is far beyond the scope of this Article.  One particular aspect, 
however, is important in the present context: most rights-based tort 
theories emphasize issues of vertical equality and reject any hint of 
horizontal equality.  Ensuring vertical equality means treating the 
plaintiff and the accused tortfeasor as existing in a closed universe.  
Under this notion, the parties are abstracted from their respective 
positions in society, as well as their positions relative to one another.  
Vertical differentiators, like wealth, class, or other markers of status 
and hierarchy, are stripped away and the parties are made 
(conceptually) equal.  What matters in this closed universe is that both 
parties are accorded by the political and legal institutions of the society 
in which they find themselves (or sue, or are sued) with the same 
bundle of rights and obligations.189  Some, but not all, of those rights 
 
 186  Id.  
 187  Id.  
 188  Nancy A. Weston, The Metaphysics of Modern Tort Theory, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 919, 
928 (1994) (“[The Coasian] position is remarkable for its formalism: In its abstraction 
of the parties from the context of accidents they lose their character as tortfeasor or 
victim—roles that, on this model, are interchangeable and so without their ordinary 
content.  That content, as reflected in traditional conceptions of tort law, has to do 
with the perceived direction of causation of the accident, with the parties’ relative 
activity and passivity in bringing it about, or with other differentia in the parties’ 
concrete relation to the occurrence of the accident.  Disregarding this relation, the 
Coasian model posits a formal equivalence, just as in the theory of the market, which 
the tort model consciously emulates.”).  
 189  See Jan Klabbers, Doing the Right Thing? Foreign Tort Law and Human Rights, in 
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give rise to correlative duties in the other party.  The legal question 
then boils down to whether those rights and duties were breached in a 
way that caused compensable injury.190  So if a billionaire were run over 
by a harried, minimum-wage service employee on her way to work, the 
law would not take into account the infinitesimally small wealth of the 
service employee in comparison to the billionaire in determining how 
much was owed in damages. 
A formulation that captures both the instrumentalist and rights-
based versions of equality has it that tort law assumes a “juridical 
equality” between the parties.191  Here, the modifier “juridical” makes 
it clear the salient features for identifying “like” cases are legal features 
(as distinguished from, say, social or economic features).  
Instrumentalist and non-instrumentalist theories may describe that 
juridical equality in different terms, of course.  The former may focus 
on the parties’ equal (legal) freedom to bargain and to pursue their 
own ends, while the latter may focus on the individuals’ reciprocal 
bundles of rights and duties. 
Broader normative theory gives a much deeper meaning to 
“equality,” of course, and many theorists take the tort system to task for 
failing to address horizontal inequality—that is, for excluding any 
notion of distributive justice that addresses all similarly situated 
individuals in a society whether or not they happen to be involved in a 
court case.192  Critiques from the distributive justice angle argue that 
 
TORTURE AS TORT 553, 558 (Craig Scott ed., 2001) (“[H]uman rights typically deal with 
individuals as part of larger communities.  By contrast, private law, and tort law in 
particular, brackets any social relation that individuals may have, instead focusing on 
the purely bilateral relation between victim and tortfeasor.”). 
 190  See Grosskopf, supra note 182, at 359 (“This . . . process is designed to allow the 
courts to take into account only one basic variable, namely whether a wrong was 
committed between the parties, and by default to reject all other possible variables, 
such as the parties’ identity, needs or wealth, as irrelevant, and hence illegitimate.”).  
 191  Cane, supra note 179, at 148 (“Mainstream theoretical accounts of the nature of 
tort law and tort liability, whether instrumentalist or non-instrumentalist, generally 
assume that both parties to a tort action are ‘juridically equal’ private agents pursuing 
their own projects and purposes.”). 
 192  See WEINRIB, supra note 183, at 206–14 (differentiating tort law, which the author 
claims expresses corrective justice, from “politics,” which he claims expresses 
horizontal equality and distributive justice); see also JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF 
PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 9 (2001) 
(explaining that “tort law is best explained by corrective justice”); ERNEST WEINRIB, 
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 2 (2012) (“Corrective justice is the term given to the relational 
structure of reasoning in private law”); Stephen Perry, On the Relationship Between 
Corrective and Distributive Justice, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 238–62 (Jeremy 
Horder ed., 2000); Martin Stone, The Significance of Doing and Suffering, in PHILOSOPHY 
AND THE LAW OF TORTS 131 (Gerald Postema ed., 2001). 
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the fiction that makes the narrow, juridical conception of equality 
work—that the parties exist in a closed universe separated from their 
actual social condition—may serve the individuals involved in the case 
but fails society as a whole.  It does so by failing to situate the potentially 
tortious behavior in the broader social system in which that behavior 
operates and in which its toleration (including by assigning a dollar 
value to its exercise) has systemic effects.193  So understood, torts should 
incorporate horizontal equality by giving significant weight to the role 
and effects of tortious behavior all across society, not just to the injurer 
and the injured.194  Those advancing the dominant, rights-based 
theories of torts defend the rejection of horizontal equality by arguing 
that torts at the bedrock normative level, is about correcting the 
specific results of specific wrongful behavior.  Therefore, “[t]he claims 
of corrective justice are limited or restricted to parties who bear some 
normatively important relationship to one another.  A person does 
not . . . have a claim in corrective justice to repair in the air, against no 
one in particular.”195 
These understandings of horizontal and vertical equality and how 
they apply to the classical law of torts governing private interactions 
between private individuals (individuals exercising their freedom to 
pursue their own projects and purposes) help to illuminate the ways in 
which the narrow model of juridical equality falls apart in the case of 
public wrongs.  First, the notion of vertical equality cannot apply where 
one of the parties is a public agent exercising a public function.196  The 
victim of a public wrong and the alleged wrongdoer do not have the 
same bundle of rights and obligations because they are, in a sense, 
completely different kinds of actors.  The former is a citizen, but the 
latter is the representative of the state and an extension of the powers 
granted to it by citizens collectively—such as the monopoly over the 
use of force.  That is not to say that the looming threat of force is the 
factor that disrupts the equal bilateral relationship of private actors.  It 
is only to illustrate one of the many ways in which a public official is 
both authorized and constrained by an entirely different set of rights 
and duties than an ordinary citizen.197  Private individuals, for instance, 
 
 193  Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 195 (2000). 
 194  Id. 
 195  Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF TORT LAW 53, 66–67 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).  
 196  ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 219–20, 225–28 (2007). 
 197  Cane, supra note 179, at 154 (“[S]tatutory and constitutional provisions may 
impose on public agents duties . . . that private agents do not have and that are 
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are free to pursue their own projects and are under no obligation that 
those projects advance the public good, or that they refrain from using 
their resources for personal, instead of common, gain.  Yet those are 
precisely the constraints we put on the state and on agents of the state 
exercising their public function.198  As clarified below, this is neither a 
stark division nor a binary choice between private individual or public 
agent.  Rather, it is a continuum.199 
The second problem that arises when considering applying 
classical torts to public wrongs is that the notion of horizontal equality 
takes on a distinctly different character and becomes intrinsic to the 
harm, rather than becoming an optional “bonus,” the justification for 
which may be debated depending on one’s theoretical tendencies.  
Remedies that address only the disequilibrium between the two parties 
to a lawsuit cannot reach the harm done to a body politic by a wrongful 
policy or practice.  The reason that judicial review or legislative reform 
are the traditional legal remedies for public wrongs is because a policy, 
practice, or law that violates the legal protections afforded to 
individuals is itself offensive to the legal regime that guarantees those 
rights, and judicial review “fixes” the entire regime.  It is not simply a 
matter of the abstracted binary relationship between two people, but 
instead an injury that implicates the nature of the proper relationship 
of a citizen to governmental power and authority.  Whereas injury to 
an individual can be remedied by compensating her for the value 
assigned to those injuries, the harm to the social contract cannot be 
remedied except by changing the offensive policy or practice. 
Consider the contrasting cases of a pedestrian hit by a speeding 
car and a murder suspect tortured to produce a confession.  Consider 
further that the torturing officer’s superiors are either complicit in, or 
willfully ignorant of, her conduct but that there is no written or formal 
rule or policy condoning torture.  In the former instance, the driver’s 
duty would only be to those pedestrians she might be in danger of 
injuring at any given time, but certainly not to all pedestrians anywhere 
 
correlative to rights . . . . [P]ublic agents may enjoy statutory protection from tort 
liability that private agents do not.”).  
 198  Cane, supra note 179, at 151 (“In this sense, states pursue public projects and 
purposes, and a public interest, which are distinguishable from and may conflict with 
the personal projects, purposes and interests of particular private agents.  To be 
justified within this framework of thought, the state’s claimed monopoly of legitimate 
coercion must be used (only) in the public interest and to promote public purposes, 
but consistently with preserving for private agents the largest possible measure of 
freedom to pursue their own projects and purposes.”).  
 199  See infra note 200 and accompanying text. 
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and at any time.  Furthermore, the driver can only be said to have 
violated that duty with respect to the person she sideswiped.  We would 
not say that the other pedestrians, those who arrived home safely, were 
somehow injured by the accident; by breaking the arm of the victim, 
the driver did not break the arms of all pedestrians everywhere.  The 
victim’s injuries were her own.  The essentially self-contained nature of 
such injuries is what makes it possible to conceptually cordon off such 
private torts from one another and to abstract tort victims from other 
members of society who suffer similar harms from non-tortious sources 
or causes. 
The police officer and her colluding superiors, by contrast, do 
have a duty to everyone (at least everyone in the territory over which 
they have authority).  When the officer tortures one person, it is true 
that only that one person suffers the physical injuries.  In that sense 
the harms are not shared.  The injury, however, is to the relationship 
between the government and the governed, specifically defined in the 
Constitution and international law to exclude torture.  The victim’s 
right to a relationship that excludes torture is diminished, but so is that 
of every other individual in the officer’s territory because in the 
moment that torture became approved or tolerated, everyone in the 
city went from living under a regime that prohibited it to one that 
allowed it.  Classifying the victim’s torture as assault and battery and 
the police officer as an individual tortfeasor would result in the victim 
being compensated but would ignore systemic characteristics of the 
case.  Such a characterization would fail to address the role of the 
officer’s superiors and to provide a remedy to the rest of the 
population for the harm done to their rights.  Public harms are not 
susceptible to being described as self-contained and are thus much 
more difficult to fit into the abstracted binary universe required by tort 
law.  The horizontal aspect of equality becomes non-optional in the 
case of public wrongs because horizontal elements are intrinsic to the 
duty, the harm, and the proper remedy. 
The inclusion of horizontal elements of equality in public torts 
need not be absolute.  The above discussion considers situations where 
the public wrongs are undertaken according to a policy or practice.  
One could argue that situations where an official was acting outside of 
established policies and practices—a rogue agent—would be closer to 
the classical model of torts since the harm would be more closely 
restricted to the individual victim.  Take the example of a homicide 
detective who systematically tortures confessions from African-
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American suspects.200  Assume that his superiors are completely 
unaware of his conduct (and that their ignorance is reasonable rather 
than willful).  The argument would be that the broader public in this 
case is not injured.  Since the detective’s superiors did not approve of 
or willfully ignore his conduct, the broader public’s right to live under 
a government that refrains from torture has not been affected.  In that 
sense, it would be more appropriate to pay compensation to the 
rogue’s victim alone, rather than to push for unnecessary institutional 
changes. 
Although it is conceptually possible for such acts to be undertaken 
in isolation by rogue agents, that may not always be the case.  In the 
Chicago police torture case, for instance, the police department and 
the city of Chicago went to great lengths to cover up Detective Burge’s 
crimes.  The more that the organization around the “rogue” is 
involved, the more the bad actor’s activities become a practice rather 
than an aberration and the more horizontal political equality is 
implicated.  At any rate, the point here is not to offer a detailed defense 
of particular sharp divisions along the continuum of public wrongs to 
which public remedies are intrinsic and those for which some kind of 
private remedy would be adequate.  The point, rather, is to note that 
the continuum exists.  Also, the more the duties, injuries, and desirable 
remedies in a case implicate horizontal political inequality, the more 
inappropriate it is to shoehorn those cases into an abstracted binary 
universe absent of horizontal considerations. 
The public tort schemes under § 1983, Bivens, and the ATS 
circumvent those problems in the ways described supra in Part II.C, but 
classical tort law has trouble adequately accounting for such 
distinctions.  This will be shown in the next section by highlighting the 
extent to which international law’s remedies for breaches of human 
rights obligations combine both horizontal and vertical elements of 
equality. 
 
 200  This is an actual case.  Chicago homicide detective John Burge tortured 
confessions from more than 100 African-American suspects using techniques such as 
electroshock.  See Special Projects Conclusion Rep. from Investigator Michael 
Goldston for the Office of Prof’l Standards, to Chief Admin. of Office of Prof’l 
Standards 6 (Sept. 28, 1990), http://peopleslawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/02/Goldston-Report-with-11.2.90-Coversheet.pdf (“In the matter of alleged 
physical abuse, the preponderance of the evidence is that abuse did occur and that it 
was systematic . . . . The type of abuse described was not limited to the usual beating, 
but went into such esoteric areas as psychological techniques and planned torture.”). 
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B. Horizontal Equality and Remedies for Public Harms 
Comparing the duties and remedies at stake in a human rights 
case decided under international law and a torts case decided under 
the common law reinforces the conclusion of the theoretical inquiry:  
the private law of tort law cannot adequately address violations of public 
law. 
The proposal that victims of human rights violations could pursue 
claims under the law of torts in state courts is premised on the idea 
that “[t]he same facts that give rise to international human rights 
violations almost always will also constitute a domestic or foreign 
tort.”201  Several commentators have noted that nearly every jurisdiction 
has a body of law that provides for civil liability for certain injuries.202  
This is seen as an advantage because state courts in tort cases would 
apply choice of law principles to determine whether to apply the law 
of the place of injury or the law of the forum.  Unless the United States 
had a compelling interest in the case, the usual result of the choice of 
law analysis would be the law of the place of injury.203  The universality 
of tort-like legal norms is therefore an important part of the argument 
that victims may still find compensation.204  Although many plaintiffs in 
ATS cases have pleaded state law tort violations, in the end they were 
adjudicated under federal/international law rather than under the 
ATS.205  Several other ATS cases actually proceeded in state courts.206 
First, briefly, the duties that give rise to public harms are different 
than the duties that give rise to private harms.  This stems from the 
 
 201  Alford, supra note 4, at 1761. 
 202  STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 57, at 120 (“The same conduct that constitutes a 
violation of international human rights norms usually also violates the law of the place 
where it occurred and the law of the forum state . . . .”); see also Hoffman & Stephens, 
supra note 45, at 1819.  
 203  Chimene Keitner, State Courts and Transitory Torts in Transnational Human Rights 
Cases, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 81, 81 (2013). 
 204  See Alford, supra note 4.  Although other systems may recognize tort harms, they 
frequently restrict the amount of damages available.  Borchers, supra note 46, at 5255.  
 205  See Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 45, at 15 (“The state law claims often drop 
out when plaintiffs obtain a judgment on the international human rights claim.”).  
 206  See, e.g., Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 718 So. 2d 971 (La. Ct. App. 1998).  
In Alomang, the Louisiana Court of Appeals itself translated the plaintiff’s claims, which 
were originally stated in terms of international law.  When the defendant objected on 
the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the appeals court noted that 
“[a]lthough the emphasized language quoted above from the opinion of the trial 
court creates the impression that the claims of the plaintiff are limited to ‘human 
rights violations and foreign environmental damages,’ plaintiff’s actual allegations are 
far broader.  Plaintiff also alleged that members of the purported class have sustained 
personal injury damages . . . .”  Id. at 972.  
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unbridgeable vertical inequality between public officials exercising 
public functions and private individuals.  That is what the Supreme 
Court was insinuating in Monroe and Bivens when it established a 
preference, at least in some circumstances, for the application of 
constitutional law over the common law.  Preserving that difference is 
one of the issues at stake in deciding whether to translate human rights 
abuses into tort harms.  Because a human rights abuse is committed by 
(or, in the case of corporations, in complicity with) a public official 
exercising a public function, torture, by definition, cannot be 
committed by a private individual—only a state official.  As one 
commentator observed: 
Thus, if torture paradigmatically involves official acts, such as 
those committed by government agents or, at least, under 
colour of law, then it becomes awkward to completely ignore 
this official aspect and instead focus on the individual 
relation between torturer and victim. To do so would be 
tantamount to denying the official element of torture, and 
thereby to render it indistinguishable from assault or battery 
or other forms of inflicting pain.207 
In other words, a police officer has a duty not to torture the citizens 
under her care that is different in kind and in origin from the duty of 
private individuals to refrain from intentional battery.  Casting the 
former as the latter obscures which kind of duty the wrongdoer 
violated. 
That distinction is important because human rights abuses, as 
opposed to torts, require remedies tailored to their nature as public 
harms.  Since international human rights law is directed not only at 
addressing the harms to individuals but also to protecting all 
individuals from similar harms, the remedies for human rights abuses 
encompass both the kinds of aims characteristic of public law—such as 
reforming the institutional structures that made the torture possible in 
the first place—and of private law—such as providing the victim with 
monetary compensation.208  International human rights law specifies 
 
 207  Klabbers, supra note 189, at 558. 
 208  See Comm. Against Torture, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 9, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/3 (Dec. 
13, 2012), http://coremanipur.org/2013/10/08/general-comment-no-3-of-the-un-
committee-against-torture/ (follow “General Comment No 3 on Article 14 CAT” 
hyperlink) (discussing the implementation of article 14 by States parties); see also Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 
16, 2005), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ 
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five aspects for the effective redress of grave human rights abuses: 
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees 
of non-repetition.209  Some of those aspects touch both the individual 
and the body politic.  Restitution, for instance, requires states to place 
the victims—to the extent possible given each specific case—in the 
position they were in prior to the abuse.210  But restitution is not only 
about the victim as an isolated individual: “For restitution to be 
effective, efforts should be made to address any structural causes of the 
violation . . . .”211  Compensation and rehabilitation, on the other hand, 
are specifically related to the individual.  Nevertheless, “monetary 
compensation alone may not be sufficient redress for a victim of 
torture and ill-treatment.”212 
The elements of satisfaction and the guarantee of non-repetition 
are almost entirely state-centric and highlight the understanding in 
international law that human rights violations require the state to 
initiate institutional reform to protect those in its territory from 
further violations.  Satisfaction, among other things, requires that 
states publicly acknowledge the violation: 
This is not simply the right of any individual victim or closely 
related persons to know what happened, a right to the truth.  
The right to know is also a collective right, drawing upon 
history to prevent violations from recurring in the future. Its 
corollary is a “duty to remember[,]”[] which the State must 
assume, in order to guard against the perversions of history 
that go under the names of revisionism or negationism; the 
knowledge of the oppression it has lived through is part of a 
people’s national heritage and as such must be preserved.  
These, then, are the main objectives of the right to know as 
a collective right.213 
 
 
RemedyAndReparation.aspx [hereinafter Basic Principles and Guidelines].  
 209  See Comm. Against Torture, supra note 208, at 2.  
 210  See Declaration of Basic Principles of Just. for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power ¶ 8, G.A. Res. 40/34 A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985), 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r034.htm (explaining that 
“[o]ffenders or third parties . . . should . . . make fair restitution to victims, their 
families or dependents.  Such restitution should include the return of property or 
payment for the harm or loss suffered, reimbursement of expenses incurred as a result 
of the victimization, the provision of services and the restoration of rights.”).  
 211  Comm. Against Torture, supra note 208, at 2. 
 212  Id.   
 213  LOUIS JOINET, COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF DETAINEES, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, at para. 17 (Oct. 
1997), http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/impu/joinet2.html.  
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That requirement is particularly important in light of the potential 
translation of international human rights abuses into tort harms.  
Although the obligation to acknowledge the violation rests on the 
wrongdoing state, the underlying rationale for the obligation—the 
rights of the individual victims to truth and of the broader society to 
knowledge in service of future prevention—would be satisfied at least 
to some extent by a neutral court finding a violation of international 
human rights law.  Returning to the facts of Filártiga, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals declared publicly and eloquently that Peña, 
and by direct implication, Paraguay, engaged in torture.  But it seems 
difficult to argue that the desire for truth and remembrance would 
have been as well satisfied, if satisfied at all, by a state court in New York 
awarding the Filártigas damages for wrongful death. 
Satisfaction and the guarantee of non-repetition require not only 
truth, but also accountability of the individuals who commit the abuses 
and of the system in which they operate.214  Individual accountability in 
this context includes the obligation to investigate alleged abuses and 
to pursue “judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable 
for the violations.”215  Institutional accountability requires states to 
identify and change the aspects of its system that contributed to the 
violations.  Since many human rights are closely tied to core 
government functions such as the maintenance of law and order or the 
management of the political process, the required changes could be 
far ranging, such as providing for: 
[C]ivilian oversight of military and security forces; ensuring 
that all judicial proceedings abide by international standards 
of due process, fairness and impartiality; strengthening the 
independence of the judiciary; protecting human rights 
defenders . . . establishing systems for regular and 
independent monitoring of all places of detention; 
providing . . . [and] training for law enforcement officials as 
well as military and security forces on human rights law.216 
 
 
 214  Satisfaction and the guarantee of non-repetition may require, in addition to 
accountability, depending on the situation, additional actions such as “effective 
measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations; verification of the facts and 
full and public disclosure of the truth . . . assistance in the recovery, identification, and 
reburial of victims’ bodies . . . an official declaration or judicial decision restoring the 
dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victim . . . public apologies . . . [and] 
commemorations and tributes to the victims.”  Comm. Against Torture, supra note 208, 
at 4.  
 215  See Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 208. 
 216  Comm. Against Torture, supra note 208, at 4. 
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In summary, international law requires, among other things, the 
following: a finding that the individual accused of violating human 
rights standards was performing a public function (or, in another 
formulation, acting under the color of law); a determination that the 
acts she is alleged to have undertaken violated the specific human 
rights standard complained of (e.g., torture); and, in the event the two 
conditions are satisfied, a finding of redress that addresses the harm to 
the victim while simultaneously ensuring both individual 
accountability for the perpetrator and institutional accountability for 
the system in which she operates.  While TPL fails to perfectly satisfy 
all of those requirements, it goes significantly further towards doing so 
than municipal tort law. 
IV. A BETTER APPROACH 
The successful transition of human rights litigation in the United 
States away from federal courts and into state courts depends on both 
the availability of international law to state courts and the extent of 
those courts’ discretion to decline to hear international law claims.  
Fortunately, state courts can, and indeed must, hear claims arising 
under the federal common law of customary international law, which 
at least includes the kinds of claims recognized by the Supreme Court 
in Sosa.  To date, commentators have largely ignored the possibility 
that state courts might be forced to hear human rights cases under 
human rights law, perhaps because the actual prospect of state court 
litigation of international human rights cases was not of practical and 
immediate concern until the Supreme Court shut the doors of federal 
courtrooms in Kiobel.  Part IV will analyze the feasibility of such a 
transition, discussing both requirements—availability and discretion—
in turn.  The first subsection will sketch out the “modern” position 
endorsed by the Court that international law is part of U.S. law and will 
advance a reading of Kiobel under which the Court left the modern 
position undisturbed.  Building on the conclusion that federal 
common law continues to provide claims under customary 
international law after Kiobel, the next subsection will argue that the 
Supremacy Clause requires state courts to hear those claims (with 
narrow exceptions). 
A. States and International Law 
Although much scholarly contention exists regarding the status of 
international law in the American legal system, courts have adopted 
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what has come to be called the “modern” position.217  This position 
asserts that the “[i]nternational law and international agreements of 
the United States are law of the United States and supreme over the 
law of the several states.”218  The modern position thus unambiguously 
holds that international law is federal law and preempts contrary state 
law.219  A brief excursion into the underpinnings of the modern 
position will help to illuminate the kind of influence federal decisions 
will likely exert over the range of claims state courts might recognize 
under international law and their flexibility in interpreting 
international law norms. 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,220 international law was part of the general law of the United 
States and was therefore available to any court at any level.221  Its 
incorporation into U.S. law was unambiguous, captured in the oft-
quoted opinion of the Court in The Paquete Habana: “[i]nternational 
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the 
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of 
 
 217  In some instances, scholars from different camps construe the same decision in 
very different ways to support very different arguments.  In that sense, the degree of 
unanimity of the courts is a matter of interpretation.  It is worth noting, however, that 
even those launching the most direct attack on the modern position acknowledge its 
pervasiveness.  See Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A 
Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1609–18 (2011). 
 218  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(1) (1987).  See also Ryan 
Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filártiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and 
Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is 
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, 
Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and 
Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: 
Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997).  
 219  Vasquez, supra note 217, at 1497–98 (“Reflecting the settled view regarding the 
status of customary international law in the U.S. legal system at the time that it was 
approved in 1987, the Restatement asserts that such law has the status of federal law.  As 
such, it preempts inconsistent State law; State courts must follow federal court 
interpretations of it; and State court interpretations of it are reviewable in the federal 
courts.”). 
 220  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 221  See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842); William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law 
and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1513 (1984); see also Koh, supra note 218, at 1831 (“Thereafter, federal courts 
construed both commercial and noncommercial rules of customary international law 
so regularly that Justice Gray provoked no dissent when he wrote: ‘International law is 
part of our law . . . .’”); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International 
Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 371 (2002) (explaining that “federal courts for nearly 100 
years applied ‘general’ law . . . sometimes called the ‘law merchant[‘]—[that] was ‘a 
subset of the law of nations’”).   
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right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”222  
Under the “Swiftian” general law approach, both federal and state 
courts were free to apply and interpret international law but neither 
could review the decisions of the other.223  The general law model was 
intended to result in the harmonization of judicial opinion on 
important topics of law, but lacked a mechanism for reliably 
generating that harmonization.224  Thus, amidst increasing concerns 
about federalism and uniformity, the Supreme Court in Erie 
announced the end of the general law and severely limited the content 
of the federal common law. 
The uniformity concerns of the Erie Court apply directly to 
international law given the potential for individual states’ actions in 
contravention of international law to harm the nation as a whole and 
to undermine the ability of the executive branch to conduct foreign 
relations.225  The first argument to that effect came shortly after the 
Court’s decision in Erie.  Philip Jessup, who would later become a judge 
on the International Court of Justice in The Hague, published an essay 
in which he argued that the decision did not change, but rather 
reinforced, the status of international law as part of the federal 
common law.  Jessup argued that “[a]ny question of applying 
international law in our courts involves the foreign relations of the 
United States and can thus be brought within a federal power.”226 
Justice Harlan, writing for an 8-1 majority in Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino, later quoted Jessup’s reasoning approvingly.227  The 
Court cited several reasons for agreeing with Jessup.  One is that, in 
 
 222  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).  
 223  Young, supra note 221. 
 224  See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 (“Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. 
Tyson had revealed it defects, political and social; and the benefits expected to flow 
from the rule did not accrue.  Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on 
questions of common law prevented uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering a 
satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law and that of local 
law developed a new well of uncertainties.”). 
 225  That strong interest in strong uniformity is sometimes called the “one voice” 
position.  Daniel Abebe, One Voice or Many? The Political Question Doctrine and Acoustic 
Dissonance in Foreign Affairs, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 233 (2012) (“A common theme in 
foreign affairs law is the importance of the US speaking with ‘one voice’ to the 
international community.  Speaking with one voice, so the story goes, ensures that the 
US is not embarrassed by multiple, inconsistent pronouncements from the several 
states or the different branches of the national government when it takes a position 
on a foreign affairs issue.”).   
 226  Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International 
Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 743 (1939).   
 227  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
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concept, foreign relations fell firmly in the realm of federal powers.228  
Another reason is that leaving international law to the states posed the 
danger of fragmentation, and therefore, the “rules of international law 
should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state 
interpretations.”229  The Court here appeared to make a structural 
argument: if states could violate international law, they could invite 
repercussions on the United States as a whole.  International law 
provides that states (the word “state” in this context refers to sovereign 
nations) as a whole are held to be responsible for violations of 
international law, even violations by some sub-unit (such as a 
regulatory agency, or one of the several states).230  In other words, a 
state (say, Canada) affected by the breach of an American state (say, 
Michigan dumping toxic waste across the international border) could 
enact countermeasures, such as economic sanctions, against the entire 
United States.231  The American Founders recognized the problem 
inherent in unfettered state conduct in the realm of international law; 
in fact, the lack of federal control over international law during the 
time of the Articles of Confederation was a major driver of the new 
Constitution’s adoption, and ensuring that the national government 
would be able to conduct foreign policy was at the forefront of the 
Founders’ minds.232  Thus, leaving states to their unfettered discretion 
in interpreting and applying international law would both create a free 
rider problem (where the country subsidizes states’ international law 
violations) and encroach on the foreign affairs power of the federal 
government. 
 
 228  Id. at 425 (explaining that “an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding 
competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our 
relationships with other members of the international community must be treated 
exclusively as an aspect of federal law”).  See also Koh, supra note 218. 
 229  Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425.  While Judge Harlan’s “endorsement of Jessup’s view 
that customary international law is federal law is admittedly dictum, . . . it was well-
considered dictum.”  Vasquez, supra note 217, at 1536; see also Koh, supra note 218. 
 230  See U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries (2001), http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/ 
instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.  
 231  See Vasquez, supra note 217, at 1517–19. 
 232  See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 19 (Max Farrand ed., 
1937) (“[Edmund Randolph] then proceeded to enumerate the defects . . . that 
particular [S]tates might by their conduct provoke war without controul [sic] . . . .”); 
see also id. at 24–25 (“[Randolph] observed that . . . [i]f a state acts against a foreign 
power contrary to the laws of nations or violates a treaty, [the Confederation] cannot 
punish that State, or compel its obedience to the treaty . . . . It therefore cannot prevent 
a war.”); JAMES MADISON, VICES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES (1787), 
reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 35, 35–36 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 
2006); Vasquez, supra note 217, at 1519 n.110. 
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Sosa, to some extent, supports the modern view by holding that 
“[w]hatever the ultimate criteria for accepting a cause of action subject 
to jurisdiction under § 1350, we are persuaded that federal courts 
should not recognize private claims under federal common law for 
violations of any international law norm with less definite content and 
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms 
familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”233  By implication, the claims under 
international law that the Court does recognize are, indeed, part of the 
federal common law.234  As Judge Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals observed, “we [now] know . . . that there is a federal 
common law of international human rights based on customary 
international law.”235  Judge Fletcher further noted that “we also [now] 
know . . . that the federal common law of customary international law 
is federal law in both the jurisdiction-conferring and the supremacy-
clause sense.”236  But did that federal common law of customary 
international law survive Kiobel?  If so, in what form? 
The federal common law of customary international law must 
have survived Kiobel intact.  Much has been made of the ambiguity of 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, but ultimately the resolution of the 
question regarding Kiobel’s treatment of international law turns on 
what the Court did not say.  The difficulty arises from the Court’s choice 
to deploy the presumption against extraterritoriality—a canon of 
statutory construction—in a situation where there was no appropriate 
statute to construct.  The Court in Sosa held, and the Court in Kiobel 
affirmed, that the ATS was merely a jurisdictional grant while the 
federal common law of international law provided the cause of 
 
 233  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004).  The majority is silent on 
which claims, exactly, might qualify.  Justice Breyer, however, in a separate opinion, 
suggested that “[t]oday international law will sometimes similarly reflect not only 
substantive agreement as to certain universally condemned behavior but also 
procedural agreement that universal jurisdiction exists to prosecute a subset of that 
behavior.  That subset includes torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes.”  Id. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  
 234  Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. 
L. REV. 2241, 2254 (2004).  This understanding of Sosa is not, however, universally 
shared.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, 
Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 
919–24 (2007); Ernest A. Young, Federal Suits and General Laws: A Comment on Judge 
Fletcher’s Reading of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 93 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 33 (2007). 
 235  William A. Fletcher, International Human Rights in American Courts, 93 VA. L. REV. 
653, 664  (2007). 
 236  Id.   
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action.237  But the presumption of extraterritoriality does not apply to 
purely jurisdictional statutes.238  Nor could a canon of statutory 
construction apply to the common law.  What, then, did the Court 
mean when it noted that “we think the principles underlying the canon 
of interpretation similarly constrain courts considering causes of 
action that may be brought under the ATS”239 or that “the principles 
underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality constrain the 
courts exercising their power under the ATS[?]”240  Some 
commentators argue that the opinion was at best ambiguous and at 
worst manipulative,241 while others read it as clearly reaching the 
federal common law of international law in addition to the ATS.242 
Both analyses miss that the Court conspicuously fails to address 
any of the touchstones of the analysis of the status of international law 
in U.S. law.  The Court in Sosa examined all the precedents a student 
of the modern position would expect to conclude that customary 
international law is indeed part of U.S. law:  The Paquete Habana,243 
Sabbatino,244 Erie,245 and esteemed commentators such as Emmerich de 
Vattel246 and Justice Jessup.247  Furthermore, the Court provides a cause 
of action for violations of a certain subset of the law of nations.  Justice 
Roberts’s failure to deal with even one of those sources in Kiobel, would 
seem to indicate that the Court was chary of fiddling with its 
conclusions about the status of international law in the United States—
particularly when it could dispense with federal litigation under the 
ATS by construing the statute alone.  Absent evidence that the Court 
 
 237  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“The ATS, 
on the other hand, is ‘strictly jurisdictional.’”) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713).  
 238  See Louise Weinberg, What We Don’t Talk About When We Talk About 
Extraterritoriality: Kiobel and the Conflict of Laws, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 1474 
(“Roberts clearly understood that a canon of statutory construction cannot be imposed 
in a blanket way on a grant of jurisdiction.”).  See also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (“We 
typically apply the presumptions to discern whether an Act of Congress regulating 
conduct applies abroad.”) (emphasis added); William S. Dodge, Guest Post: Dodge—The 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Does Not Apply to Jurisdictional Statutes, OPINIO JURIS 
(Jan. 28, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/28/guest-post-dodge-
presumption-extraterritoriality-apply-jurisdictional-statutes/.   
 239  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.  
 240  Id. at 1665. 
 241  Weinberg, supra note 238.  
 242  Young, supra note 44. 
 243  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004). 
 244  Id. at 726. 
 245  Id.  
 246  Id. at 714. 
 247  Id.  
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in Kiobel reinterpreted any of the relevant precedents that informed its 
characterization of the federal common law of customary international 
law in Sosa, the conclusion must be that the characterization remains 
intact. 
Having established that at least some norms of customary 
international law are part of the federal common law, the Court failed 
to specify whether it was restricting the causes of action under the ATS 
because: (a) only those international norms enjoying “definite content 
and acceptance among civilized nations”248 are part of the federal 
common law (“Option A”); or (b) some larger body of international 
norms are part of the federal common law, but out of judicial restraint 
the Court would only recognize causes of action for the subset of those 
norms enjoying “definite content and acceptance among civilized 
nations”249 (“Option B”).  It is crucial to distinguish here between claims 
available under the federal common law of international law and the 
norms of the federal common law of international law.  The two 
categories might be, but need not be, coextensive.  Federal law is full 
of norms that provide no basis for recourse to the courts.250  Hence the 
category of international law norms may be significantly larger than 
the category of federal claims available under those norms. 
This is important because state courts, as courts of general 
jurisdiction, do not require a specific jurisdictional grant like federal 
courts do—constrained by Article III of the Constitution.251  The 
Court’s finding in Kiobel that the jurisdiction conferred by the ATS on 
federal courts did not extend outside the territory of the United States 
would not therefore bind state courts when considering the extent of 
their own jurisdiction.252  Nor would state courts obviously be bound by 
the Court’s determination in Sosa of the claims available under the 
federal common law since that decision construed the limits of federal, 
not state, jurisdiction.253  Under Option B (where the category of norms 
 
 248  Id. at 694.  
 249  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 694.  
 250  Indeed, as the Court acknowledges in Sosa, “[a]ccordingly, even when Congress 
has made it clear by statute that a rule applies to purely domestic conduct, we are 
reluctant to infer intent to provide a private cause of action where the statute does not 
supply one expressly.”  Id. at 727.  
 251   U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 252  Recall the Court’s holding in Sosa that the ATS was a mere jurisdictional grant.  
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 694 (explaining that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no 
new causes of action”). 
 253  See Vasquez, supra note 217, at 1626 (“The Court in Sosa did not directly address 
whether the States were permitted to recognize a right of action for damages to 
enforce norms of international law not meeting the heightened standard of clarity and 
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is larger than the category of claims) state courts would therefore be 
free to consider human rights claims for violations of customary 
international norms that fall short of the Court’s lofty standard in Sosa.  
Under Option A (where the categories of norms and claims are 
coextensive), such additional claims would not be available to states 
because they would not be part of the federal common law.254 
There are several reasons to be hesitant about embracing Option 
B.  First, the Court’s restraint in implying new causes of action suggests 
that it was concerned about intruding on the foreign affairs 
prerogative of the executive and legislative branches: 
[T]he potential implications for the foreign relations of the 
United States of recognizing such causes should make courts 
particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the 
Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign 
affairs. It is one thing for American courts to enforce 
constitutional limits on our own State and Federal 
Governments’ power, but quite another to consider suits 
under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the 
power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and to 
hold that a foreign government or its agent has transgressed 
those limits.255 
If the Court was concerned that federal judicial action on certain types 
of weaker international law claims could encroach on the discretion of 
the political branches, it would be counterintuitive to suppose that the 
Court would acquiesce in state courts entertaining such weaker claims.  
Another reason to be wary is that state courts extending too far past 
the doctrinal limits established by federal courts could tempt the 
Supreme Court to bring the “dormant implied international relations 
clause”256 out of retirement to invalidate state acts that touch, even 
lightly, on foreign policy.257 
At the least, then, those international law claims that would pass 
Sosa’s stringent standards are available to state courts (Option A).  But 
the ability to apply international law is not the same as the willingness 
 
breadth of acceptance that it articulated.”). 
 254  Of course this presupposes that courts will continue to endorse the modern 
view.  The revisionist position and most of the views advanced as intermediate positions 
would argue (albeit for different reasons) that international law remains available to 
the states without regard for the actions of the federal government.  See id. 
 255  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.  
 256  Fletcher, supra note 235, at 667.   
 257  Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) (invalidating a state probate 
statute due to “state involvement in foreign affairs and international relations—
matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government”). 
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to do so.  The next section will show that if human rights cases make it 
into state courts (past a host of constitutional and procedural 
obstacles), those courts will be compelled to apply the federal common 
law of international law. 
B. Mandatory State Court Jurisdiction over International Law 
If the foregoing analysis is correct and federal common law 
continues to provide causes of action under the law of nations after 
Kiobel, then state courts will have no choice but to hear such claims 
unless the federal causes of action are excluded by a neutral rule of 
judicial administration.258  Commentators have recognized for some 
time that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over international 
law claims.259  Indeed, the original text of the statute expressly provided 
for the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts.260  Assuming that 
international law remains part of the federal common law after Kiobel, 
there is every reason to believe that state courts retain that concurrent 
jurisdiction and that they must exercise it when called upon to do so.  
State courts have at best limited discretion to refuse to entertain 
federal claims, which has been established precedent since the end of 
the Civil War when, in Claflin v. Houseman, the Court read the 
Supremacy Clause to require state courts to apply federal law.261  It is 
 
 258  Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 735 (2009) (“So strong is the presumption of 
concurrency that it is defeated only in two narrowly defined circumstances:  first, when 
Congress expressly ousts state courts of jurisdiction, and second ‘[w]hen a state court 
refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the 
courts.’”) (citations omitted).  
 259  William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in 
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 509 (1986) (“The logical 
conclusion in view of the general presumption of concurrent jurisdiction and the 
codification of section 1350 is that the states have concurrent jurisdiction over all cases 
arguably within the statute.”); Joan Hartman, Enforcement of International Human Rights 
Law in State and Federal Courts, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 741, 748 (1985) (“In state courts the 
claim would simply be treated as a cause of action arising under federal common law, 
and any court of general jurisdiction could probably take cognizance of it.  There is 
no barrier to state courts entertaining cases arising under international law, and the 
ordinary concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts is appropriate for 
international cases.”).  
 260  In its original form, the Judiciary Act of 1789 read, in pertinent part, that district 
courts “shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or 
the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only 
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”  The Judiciary Act of 
1789, Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.  Nor should the later deletion of the phrase be read as 
Congressional intent to establish exclusive federal jurisdiction.  See Casto, supra note 
259, at 508 n.232.  
 261  Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876) (noting that state and federal law 
“together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for 
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worth emphasizing in this context that international law, generally 
speaking, is federal law in the Supremacy Clause sense.262  Despite a 
series of vehement attacks by scholars skeptical of according 
international law the status of federal law,263 no court has yet adopted 
a view contrary to the Restatement’s formulation.264  Claflin established 
the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction for federal statutory law, 
and subsequent cases held that the presumption includes federal 
common law as well.265  From the inception of the modern 
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, the Court recognized that in 
some instances state courts might validly decline to hear federal claims, 
asserting by implication that state courts might escape the 
presumption where they lacked the competence to hear the kind of 
 
the State; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each other, nor to 
be treated by each other as such, but as courts of the same country, having jurisdiction 
partly different and partly concurrent”).  Testa v. Katt approvingly quoted language 
from a prior case: 
The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy 
of the State, and therefore that the courts of the state are free to decline 
jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal 
contemplation does not exist.  When Congress, in the exertion of the 
power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for 
all the people and all the states, and thereby established a policy for all.  
That policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had 
emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly 
in the courts of the state.  
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1947) (quoting Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & 
Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 57 (1912)).  
 262  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 cmt. d (1987) 
(“International agreements of the United States other than treaties (see § 303), and 
customary international law, while not mentioned explicitly in the Supremacy Clause, 
are also federal law and as such are supreme over State law.  Interpretations of 
international agreements by the United States Supreme Court are binding on the 
States.  Customary international law is considered to be like common law in the United 
States, but it is federal law.  A determination of international law by the Supreme Court 
is binding on the States and on State courts.”).  
 263  Opponents of the modern position fall into one of two camps: revisionist or 
intermediate.  For the revolutionist position, see, for example, Curtis A. Bradley & Jack 
L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary 
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 815 (1997); and Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the 
Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998).  For the intermediate 
position, which has several variations, see A. M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, 
and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995) and Young, supra note 221, at 370.  
 264  It is worth noting, however, that the American Law Institute has begun work on 
the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law.  Many of the main players from 
all sides of the academic debate are participants in the project.  
 265  See Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). 
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claim being brought.266  Beginning almost immediately, the Court 
began to more clearly identify, and to narrow, the grounds on which a 
state court might validly decline jurisdiction over federal claims.267  In 
Testa v. Katt the Court indicated that state courts were not free to refuse 
to hear federal claims where “[state] courts have jurisdiction adequate 
and appropriate under local law to adjudicate this action.”268  It is at 
this juncture that the importance of categorizing ATS cases alongside 
Bivens and § 1983 cases reasserts itself. 
The Court took the opportunity, in a series of cases arising from 
the reluctance of state courts to entertain § 1983 cases against state 
officials, to limit significantly the ability of state courts to refuse to hear 
federal claims.  In the Court’s view, only two circumstances warranted 
such refusal: where Congress expressly created exclusive federal 
jurisdiction, or where there exists an application of a “neutral state rule 
regarding the administration of the courts.”269  In several of those cases, 
the Court found state courts presumptively competent to hear federal 
cases where the state judicial power, understood broadly, empowered 
state courts to hear the types of cases and issue the type of relief at stake 
in the federal claim.270  The implication of the Court’s jurisprudence 
on the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction is that states need not 
establish courts of general jurisdiction, but if they do so then those 
courts must entertain federal claims which require hearing the type of 
claim (such as injury caused by a public official) and issuing the type 
of remedy (such as equitable relief or monetary damages) that those 
 
 266  Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) (“Legal or equitable rights, 
acquired under either system of laws, may be enforced in any court of either 
sovereignty competent to hear and determine such kind of rights and not restrained 
by its constitution in the exercise of such jurisdiction.”). 
 267  Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 57 (1912) (“The 
suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the state, and 
therefore that the courts of the state are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite 
inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist.  
When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution, 
adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the states, and thereby established 
a policy for all.  That policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had 
emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts 
of the state.”). 
 268  Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947). 
 269  Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 392 (1990). 
 270  See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 146 n.3 (1988) (where the Court looked to 
“common law tort analogues” to evaluate the competence of state courts); see also 
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980) (“[W]here the same type of claim, 
if arising under state law, would be enforced in the state courts, the state courts are 
generally not free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim.”). 
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state courts are competent to adjudicate.271 
In practice, then, the validity of any given state court’s refusal to 
hear claims arising under the federal common law of customary 
international law would depend on whether such refusal rested on a 
neutral rule of judicial administration.  The Court has approved 
several of these, including:  statutes requiring at least one party is a 
resident of the state;272 venue laws that restricted jurisdiction where the 
cause of action arose outside the territory of the state;273 and forum non 
conveniens.274  And so we return to the observation made at the outset 
of this Article.  Plaintiffs will face many barriers to bringing human 
rights claims in state courts.  Some are constitutional, such as the limits 
on general personal jurisdiction over foreign corporate subsidiaries.275  
Others are procedural, such as forum non conveniens.276  Barriers will vary 
from state to state.  But this Article is not about the barriers to accessing 
state courts; it is about what happens in the likely event that ambitious 
advocates and motivated plaintiffs overcome those barriers.  As the 
foregoing analysis makes clear, plaintiffs who make it past the doors of 
state courts will find themselves facing judges required by the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution to hear claims arising 
under those norms of customary international law that have become 
part of the federal common law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
All the groundbreaking advantages of litigation under the ATS 
that have occupied scholars and advocates since the Second Circuit’s 
landmark decision in Filártiga stand to be lost if the next generation of 
human rights claims in the United States is brought in state courts as 
tort claims.  Like all public torts, the public international torts 
 
 271  See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 380 (“The requirement that a state court of competent 
jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not necessarily include within 
it a requirement that the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the 
federal claim is presented.  The general rule, bottomed deeply in the belief in the 
importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the 
state courts as it finds them.”); see also Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 740 (2009) 
(“We therefore hold that, having made the decision to create courts of general 
jurisdiction that regularly sit to entertain analogous suits, New York is not at liberty to 
shut the courthouse door to federal claims that it considers at odds with local policy.”). 
 272  See, e.g., Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). 
 273  See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).   
 274  See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950). 
 275  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 285657 
(2011).  
 276  Whytock et al., supra note 45, at 6.  
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recognized under federal common law blend public-law and private-
law remedies into a hybrid that more closely adheres to the 
international legal standards for redress of international human rights 
violations rather than either standard public-law remedies or strictly 
private-law ones.  The former—judicial review and legislative reform—
ignore the injury to specific victims in favor of systemic change.  The 
latter rejects systemic considerations and focuses exclusively on the 
parties, abstracted from their respective positions (official or not) in 
society.  Redress for public harms should encompass both kinds of 
remedies, an avenue offered only by public torts. 
Advocates seeking to translate international human rights abuses 
into tort harms in order to gain access to state courts are not only 
sacrificing normativity on the altar of practicality, but are doing so 
unnecessarily.  State courts may be compelled to hear cases arising under 
customary international law as part of the federal common law.  But 
even if they are not, many state courts have shown their willingness to 
recognize public torts when the underlying rights are compelling and 
the claimants have no alternative remedies.  The next generation of 
human rights cases in the United States should therefore be filed as 
international human rights cases.  No translation necessary. 
 
